University of Tehran Law Quarterly 2588-5618 55 4 2026 01 18 The Establishment of Maritime Courts in Judicial System of Iran: from Necessity to Implementation The Establishment of Maritime Courts in Judicial System of Iran: from Necessity to Implementation 521 547 105542 10.22059/jlq.2026.393964.1007985 FA Mohammad Abouata Associate Professor, Department of Law, Faculty of Humanities, University of Semnan, Semnan, Iran. Journal Article 2025 05 21 Introduction A considerable part of maritime law matters, was incorporated into the Iranian Maritime Act of 1964, by way of adaptation from certain international conventions and/or Acts/ legislation enacted by other countries. Accurate and proper judgment in relation to these issues requires the establishment of specialised courts and adjudication by knowledgeable and experienced judges. Accordingly, in light of the experience of numerous countries and various facts, particularly the significant volume, importance and technical complexity of various maritime claims, it is necessary to establish a specialised maritime court as a dedicated court in designated judicial districts, endowed with certain specific powers and duties, including in particular with respect to the enumeration of claims subject to its jurisdiction, service of judicial documents outside Iran, the conduct of proceedings, ship arrest, among other matters, within the judicial district of Tehran and littoral provinces in order to adjudicate such claims. Methodology This article examines the necessity for, and the modalities of, the establishment of maritime courts in Iran’s judicial system using a comparative and analytical methodology based on documentary and library research. Conclusions Issues arising within the field of maritime law are generally highly specialised in nature, and a significant portion of them were entered into the Iranian Maritime Code of 1964 through the incorporation of international conventions or foreign laws. Proper and thorough adjudication of such matters, from various perspectives, requires the existence of specialised judicial bodies staffed by knowledgeable and experienced judges. Despite this requirement, and notwithstanding the explicit provision of Article 188 of the Iranian Maritime Code of 1964 requiring the establishment of maritime courts to adjudicate disputes arising from the implementation of the law, as well as Article 23 of the Law on the Protection of Seas and Navigable Rivers against Oil Pollution of 1389 (2010), which obliges the Judiciary to designate specialised courts in littoral provinces to hear maritime claims, this requirement has yet to be implemented within Iran’s judicial system. In practice, general courts located in Tehran and the various provinces, in accordance with the provisions of territorial jurisdiction set forth in the Code of Civil Procedure or any other relevant laws, exercise jurisdiction over diverse maritime disputes. This objective has been achieved in other countries through a variety of institutional arrangements. In England, pursuant to the Senior Courts Act 1981, the Admiralty Court sitting in London has inherent jurisdiction over maritime claims. Concurrently, under the County Courts Act 1984 and subject to the prescribed monetary thresholds and the discretion of the higher judicial authorities specified therein, certain of the county courts throughout England and Wales may also exercise jurisdiction over maritime matters. In France, commercial courts have jurisdiction over maritime disputes as part of commercial litigation; however, in areas where such courts do not exist, tribunal d’instance / judicial courts are authorised, subject to legal conditions, to hear maritime claims. In China, specialised maritime people’s courts set up across the country have jurisdiction over maritime disputes. In Iran, apart from the statutory obligations set forth in Article 188 of the Maritime Code and Article 23 of the Law on the Protection of Seas and Navigable Rivers against Oil Pollution (1389), and in light of multiple considerations—particularly the significant volume of maritime litigation and the importance and technical nature of such disputes—it is necessary to establish maritime courts as specialised judicial bodies within the judicial district of Tehran, as well as, where deemed appropriate by the Head of the Judiciary, in selected judicial districts of littoral provinces. From a procedural perspective, considering the legal approach of the countries examined—where general civil procedural laws govern maritime litigation—and with careful regard to the provisions of the Iranian Code of Civil Procedure, it appears that this Code possesses the requisite capacity to govern the adjudication of maritime disputes . Accordingly, within the framework of a law on the establishment of maritime courts, besides detailing provisions relating to the establishment of such courts and clearly defining their subject-matter and territorial jurisdiction, it should incorporate, where required, specific procedural and formal rules, including those concerning the service of judicial documents upon persons residing outside Iran, appropriate regulations governing the course of proceedings and evidentiary matters, as well as special rules on the arrest of ships. In this manner, the application of the Code of Civil Procedure to maritime disputes could be supplemented or modified to the degree required. Introduction A considerable part of maritime law matters, was incorporated into the Iranian Maritime Act of 1964, by way of adaptation from certain international conventions and/or Acts/ legislation enacted by other countries. Accurate and proper judgment in relation to these issues requires the establishment of specialised courts and adjudication by knowledgeable and experienced judges. Accordingly, in light of the experience of numerous countries and various facts, particularly the significant volume, importance and technical complexity of various maritime claims, it is necessary to establish a specialised maritime court as a dedicated court in designated judicial districts, endowed with certain specific powers and duties, including in particular with respect to the enumeration of claims subject to its jurisdiction, service of judicial documents outside Iran, the conduct of proceedings, ship arrest, among other matters, within the judicial district of Tehran and littoral provinces in order to adjudicate such claims. Methodology This article examines the necessity for, and the modalities of, the establishment of maritime courts in Iran’s judicial system using a comparative and analytical methodology based on documentary and library research. Conclusions Issues arising within the field of maritime law are generally highly specialised in nature, and a significant portion of them were entered into the Iranian Maritime Code of 1964 through the incorporation of international conventions or foreign laws. Proper and thorough adjudication of such matters, from various perspectives, requires the existence of specialised judicial bodies staffed by knowledgeable and experienced judges. Despite this requirement, and notwithstanding the explicit provision of Article 188 of the Iranian Maritime Code of 1964 requiring the establishment of maritime courts to adjudicate disputes arising from the implementation of the law, as well as Article 23 of the Law on the Protection of Seas and Navigable Rivers against Oil Pollution of 1389 (2010), which obliges the Judiciary to designate specialised courts in littoral provinces to hear maritime claims, this requirement has yet to be implemented within Iran’s judicial system. In practice, general courts located in Tehran and the various provinces, in accordance with the provisions of territorial jurisdiction set forth in the Code of Civil Procedure or any other relevant laws, exercise jurisdiction over diverse maritime disputes. This objective has been achieved in other countries through a variety of institutional arrangements. In England, pursuant to the Senior Courts Act 1981, the Admiralty Court sitting in London has inherent jurisdiction over maritime claims. Concurrently, under the County Courts Act 1984 and subject to the prescribed monetary thresholds and the discretion of the higher judicial authorities specified therein, certain of the county courts throughout England and Wales may also exercise jurisdiction over maritime matters. In France, commercial courts have jurisdiction over maritime disputes as part of commercial litigation; however, in areas where such courts do not exist, tribunal d’instance / judicial courts are authorised, subject to legal conditions, to hear maritime claims. In China, specialised maritime people’s courts set up across the country have jurisdiction over maritime disputes. In Iran, apart from the statutory obligations set forth in Article 188 of the Maritime Code and Article 23 of the Law on the Protection of Seas and Navigable Rivers against Oil Pollution (1389), and in light of multiple considerations—particularly the significant volume of maritime litigation and the importance and technical nature of such disputes—it is necessary to establish maritime courts as specialised judicial bodies within the judicial district of Tehran, as well as, where deemed appropriate by the Head of the Judiciary, in selected judicial districts of littoral provinces. From a procedural perspective, considering the legal approach of the countries examined—where general civil procedural laws govern maritime litigation—and with careful regard to the provisions of the Iranian Code of Civil Procedure, it appears that this Code possesses the requisite capacity to govern the adjudication of maritime disputes . Accordingly, within the framework of a law on the establishment of maritime courts, besides detailing provisions relating to the establishment of such courts and clearly defining their subject-matter and territorial jurisdiction, it should incorporate, where required, specific procedural and formal rules, including those concerning the service of judicial documents upon persons residing outside Iran, appropriate regulations governing the course of proceedings and evidentiary matters, as well as special rules on the arrest of ships. In this manner, the application of the Code of Civil Procedure to maritime disputes could be supplemented or modified to the degree required.

https://jlq.ut.ac.ir/article_105542_9eff2542a20cc9b0d97c3eb910779027.pdf

University of Tehran Law Quarterly 2588-5618 55 4 2026 01 18 A Critical Reconsideration of the Concepts of “Morā‘ī” and “Mawqūf” A Critical Reconsideration of the Concepts of “Morā‘ī” and “Mawqūf” 549 580 105543 10.22059/jlq.2026.405047.1008044 FA Mohammadmehdi Alsharif Associate Professor, Department of Law, Faculty of Administrative Sciences and Economics, University of Isfahan, Isfahan, Iran. Journal Article 2025 11 17 Introduction Traditionally, unauthorized transactions (fuḍūlī) and the sale of pledged property (bay‘ al-rahn) were regarded as prime examples of “non-effectiveness” (‘adam al-nofūdh) in legal thought. These contracts, lacking full legal efficacy, were considered cases in which the intended legal effects were not realized due to various factors. However, after careful analysis, jurists identified several significant differences between these two types of agreements, particularly in the processes of rejection and ratification. Consequently, alongside the concept of non-effectiveness, another legal status termed “morā‘ī” was proposed to account for these differences. This term was employed to categorize the sale of pledged property as a legal status that was neither fully effective nor entirely ineffective. Over time, this analysis gained broader acceptance among jurists and was extended to other cases. Numerous additional examples, including the contract of sale addressed in Unifying Ruling No. 810, were also classified as morā‘ī. Despite widespread agreement in describing the sale of pledged property as morā‘ī, significant theoretical disagreements persist among scholars regarding the precise nature of this legal status. The majority of jurists, consistent with their interpretation of morā‘ī, have argued that it represents a situation in which all elements necessary for legal effect are present, yet effectiveness is blocked by an external obstacle. In contrast, others have likened morā‘ī to “tentative ownership” with retroactive effects. Another view regards it as a valid contract subject to potential dissolution, while some scholars equate it with a “non-opposable contract” that is not binding on third parties or affected persons. Method This research adopts a doctrinal and comparative methodology, combining qualitative analysis of legal texts and theoretical frameworks with comparative examination of doctrinal positions and judicial precedents. By integrating doctrinal analysis with historical-legal case studies, this approach provides a more nuanced understanding of how Imāmī jurists have conceptualized the nature of morā‘ī and related doctrines in Islamic legal thought. The combination of qualitative and historical perspectives clarifies complex issues and offers a comprehensive examination of distinctions among various legal concepts, including unauthorized transactions, the sale of pledged property, and other categories related to non-effectiveness. Conclusions Notably, most of these legal scholars have heavily relied on Imāmī jurisprudence and interpretations by Imāmī jurists in developing their views on morā‘ī. However, a deeper examination of Imāmī jurisprudence reveals that the morā‘ī contract, as understood by these jurists, does not precisely match any of the aforementioned descriptions. Contrary to these scholars’ views, the sale of pledged property—along with most similar examples—more appropriately falls within the doctrinal categories of “non-effective” (ghayr nāfidh) or “suspended” (mawqūf). These categories indicate that such agreements lack full legal effectiveness not due to internal deficiency, but owing to external obstacles or pending events that prevent their final enforcement. In its most precise legal sense, morā‘ī refers to a situation in which a subsequent event, at the level of ontological causation, has no influence on the causal chain of the prior event; rather, it merely serves to reveal the prior causal effect. This fundamentally differs from contracts classified as mawqūf or non-effective, where the subsequent event constitutes a vital component of the complete causal chain and thus plays a causal role in producing legal consequences. Whether this causal operation is described as declaratory (kāshif) or transferring (nāqil), the subsequent event remains central to the cause and its legal ramifications. Therefore, from a jurisprudential perspective, only pure declaratory effect—which pertains to the evidentiary realm and the removal of doubt—qualifies as morā‘ī. In all other instances where the subsequent event is an integral part of the complete cause, the situation logically falls under mawqūf, even if one holds that the final component of the cause is merely declaratory. Consequently, acknowledging that the issue in the sale of pledged property and similar cases arises from the presence of an obstacle creates a fundamental contradiction with classifying these transactions as morā‘ī. The reason lies in the fact that the absence of an obstacle constitutes one of the essential components of the complete cause, undeniably influencing the causal effectiveness or ineffectiveness of the prior event. The distinction between unauthorized transactions and the sale of pledged property can therefore be traced to differences in the cause of non-effectiveness or the remaining component of the complete causal chain. In unauthorized transactions, non-effectiveness stems from the absence of requisite capacity (muqtaḍī). In contrast, in the sale of pledged property, it arises from the presence of an obstacle. In cases of suspension due to an obstacle, once the obstacle is removed, the requisite capacity produces its legal effect without requiring ratification. In such cases, only the exercise of the right by the right-holder—not their rejection—leads to the invalidity of the contract. Introduction Traditionally, unauthorized transactions (fuḍūlī) and the sale of pledged property (bay‘ al-rahn) were regarded as prime examples of “non-effectiveness” (‘adam al-nofūdh) in legal thought. These contracts, lacking full legal efficacy, were considered cases in which the intended legal effects were not realized due to various factors. However, after careful analysis, jurists identified several significant differences between these two types of agreements, particularly in the processes of rejection and ratification. Consequently, alongside the concept of non-effectiveness, another legal status termed “morā‘ī” was proposed to account for these differences. This term was employed to categorize the sale of pledged property as a legal status that was neither fully effective nor entirely ineffective. Over time, this analysis gained broader acceptance among jurists and was extended to other cases. Numerous additional examples, including the contract of sale addressed in Unifying Ruling No. 810, were also classified as morā‘ī. Despite widespread agreement in describing the sale of pledged property as morā‘ī, significant theoretical disagreements persist among scholars regarding the precise nature of this legal status. The majority of jurists, consistent with their interpretation of morā‘ī, have argued that it represents a situation in which all elements necessary for legal effect are present, yet effectiveness is blocked by an external obstacle. In contrast, others have likened morā‘ī to “tentative ownership” with retroactive effects. Another view regards it as a valid contract subject to potential dissolution, while some scholars equate it with a “non-opposable contract” that is not binding on third parties or affected persons. Method This research adopts a doctrinal and comparative methodology, combining qualitative analysis of legal texts and theoretical frameworks with comparative examination of doctrinal positions and judicial precedents. By integrating doctrinal analysis with historical-legal case studies, this approach provides a more nuanced understanding of how Imāmī jurists have conceptualized the nature of morā‘ī and related doctrines in Islamic legal thought. The combination of qualitative and historical perspectives clarifies complex issues and offers a comprehensive examination of distinctions among various legal concepts, including unauthorized transactions, the sale of pledged property, and other categories related to non-effectiveness. Conclusions Notably, most of these legal scholars have heavily relied on Imāmī jurisprudence and interpretations by Imāmī jurists in developing their views on morā‘ī. However, a deeper examination of Imāmī jurisprudence reveals that the morā‘ī contract, as understood by these jurists, does not precisely match any of the aforementioned descriptions. Contrary to these scholars’ views, the sale of pledged property—along with most similar examples—more appropriately falls within the doctrinal categories of “non-effective” (ghayr nāfidh) or “suspended” (mawqūf). These categories indicate that such agreements lack full legal effectiveness not due to internal deficiency, but owing to external obstacles or pending events that prevent their final enforcement. In its most precise legal sense, morā‘ī refers to a situation in which a subsequent event, at the level of ontological causation, has no influence on the causal chain of the prior event; rather, it merely serves to reveal the prior causal effect. This fundamentally differs from contracts classified as mawqūf or non-effective, where the subsequent event constitutes a vital component of the complete causal chain and thus plays a causal role in producing legal consequences. Whether this causal operation is described as declaratory (kāshif) or transferring (nāqil), the subsequent event remains central to the cause and its legal ramifications. Therefore, from a jurisprudential perspective, only pure declaratory effect—which pertains to the evidentiary realm and the removal of doubt—qualifies as morā‘ī. In all other instances where the subsequent event is an integral part of the complete cause, the situation logically falls under mawqūf, even if one holds that the final component of the cause is merely declaratory. Consequently, acknowledging that the issue in the sale of pledged property and similar cases arises from the presence of an obstacle creates a fundamental contradiction with classifying these transactions as morā‘ī. The reason lies in the fact that the absence of an obstacle constitutes one of the essential components of the complete cause, undeniably influencing the causal effectiveness or ineffectiveness of the prior event. The distinction between unauthorized transactions and the sale of pledged property can therefore be traced to differences in the cause of non-effectiveness or the remaining component of the complete causal chain. In unauthorized transactions, non-effectiveness stems from the absence of requisite capacity (muqtaḍī). In contrast, in the sale of pledged property, it arises from the presence of an obstacle. In cases of suspension due to an obstacle, once the obstacle is removed, the requisite capacity produces its legal effect without requiring ratification. In such cases, only the exercise of the right by the right-holder—not their rejection—leads to the invalidity of the contract.

https://jlq.ut.ac.ir/article_105543_3a2d6a00aaf59cc38bdacde59b51817a.pdf

University of Tehran Law Quarterly 2588-5618 55 4 2026 01 18 The Role of Domestic Law in the Jurisprudence of the International Court of Justice in Diplomatic Protection Cases The Role of Domestic Law in the Jurisprudence of the International Court of Justice in Diplomatic Protection Cases 581 604 105544 10.22059/jlq.2026.391985.1007980 FA Hamid Alhouei Nazari Assistant Professor, Department of Public Law, Faculty of Law and Political Science, University of Tehran, Tehran, Iran. Hanie Molavi PhD Candidate in International Law, Department of Public Law, Faculty of Law and Political Science, University of Tehran, Tehran, Iran. Journal Article 2025 04 20 Introduction The relationship between domestic and international law has long been a subject of debate. At first sight, invoking domestic law in international judicial proceedings may seem inconsistent with the international judicial function of the International Court of Justice (ICJ). Since then, developments in international law have led to broader interaction between domestic and international law. Accordingly, the manner in which the Court has employed domestic law no longer reflects a rigid distinction between domestic and international legal systems as traditionally conceived. Where international law refers to rules of domestic law, or where such rules constitute an integral part of an international legal norm, the Court may apply domestic law. In other situations, although international law constitutes the law applicable to the dispute as such, specific aspects of the case may nevertheless necessitate recourse to domestic law. In these circumstances, domestic law is said to form part of the applicable law. In this regard, a considerable number of treaties contain provisions that expressly refer to the domestic law of States, or employ concepts whose interpretation presupposes an understanding within a particular domestic legal framework. Moreover, in certain cases the Court is required to apply domestic law to specific factual elements of the dispute, most notably in cases concerning diplomatic protection. Accordingly, the present study outlines the traditional theoretical approaches concerning the role of domestic law in the international legal order as reflected in the Court’s jurisprudence. It then departs from prevailing assumptions to analyze how, in certain contexts, the Court has integrated domestic law into its judicial reasoning in ways that go beyond its conventional evidentiary function. Method This study adopts a descriptive-analytical and qualitative methodology based on documentary and library-based research. Employing an inductive approach, it carefully examines the jurisprudence of the International Court of Justice, including separate and dissenting opinions, through a systematic analysis of relevant judgments and advisory opinions, with particular attention to cases involving diplomatic protection. By drawing legal data from primary judicial decisions and other authoritative scholarly sources, the study derives its conclusions from patterns identified within the Court’s practice concerning the role of domestic law. Conclusion Building on the approach of its predecessor, the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ), which treated domestic law as mere facts in the Certain German Interests in Polish Upper Silesia case, the jurisprudence of the International Court of Justice has nevertheless evolved. While the ICJ in its early decisions largely reaffirmed the Permanent Court’s position and asserted itself as an organ of the international legal order, it has gradually developed a more nuanced engagement with domestic law. Domestic law, as an independent and distinct legal system, has nonetheless influenced the development of international law and assisted the Court in fulfilling its judicial functions. Independent systems can exert mutual influence without compromising their autonomy. Domestic and international legal systems are therefore not merely coexisting regimes; they are complementary and interdependent, cooperating to enhance the public order of the international community. This interaction is particularly evident in cases concerning diplomatic protection, where the Court has engaged with domestic legal processes, most notably in determining nationality as a prerequisite for the exercise of diplomatic protection. Similarly, domestic law has been invoked as an interpretative element in relation to unilateral declarations of States and declarations accepting the Court’s compulsory jurisdiction. In such instances, the Court neither applies domestic law as a binding rule nor treats it as a mere factual matter. Rather, domestic law operates as a normatively relevant consideration within the Court’s international legal reasoning. Ultimately, a rigid distinction between domestic and international law proves untenable, as matters governed by one legal system may, in specific contexts, enter the normative domain of the other. Introduction The relationship between domestic and international law has long been a subject of debate. At first sight, invoking domestic law in international judicial proceedings may seem inconsistent with the international judicial function of the International Court of Justice (ICJ). Since then, developments in international law have led to broader interaction between domestic and international law. Accordingly, the manner in which the Court has employed domestic law no longer reflects a rigid distinction between domestic and international legal systems as traditionally conceived. Where international law refers to rules of domestic law, or where such rules constitute an integral part of an international legal norm, the Court may apply domestic law. In other situations, although international law constitutes the law applicable to the dispute as such, specific aspects of the case may nevertheless necessitate recourse to domestic law. In these circumstances, domestic law is said to form part of the applicable law. In this regard, a considerable number of treaties contain provisions that expressly refer to the domestic law of States, or employ concepts whose interpretation presupposes an understanding within a particular domestic legal framework. Moreover, in certain cases the Court is required to apply domestic law to specific factual elements of the dispute, most notably in cases concerning diplomatic protection. Accordingly, the present study outlines the traditional theoretical approaches concerning the role of domestic law in the international legal order as reflected in the Court’s jurisprudence. It then departs from prevailing assumptions to analyze how, in certain contexts, the Court has integrated domestic law into its judicial reasoning in ways that go beyond its conventional evidentiary function. Method This study adopts a descriptive-analytical and qualitative methodology based on documentary and library-based research. Employing an inductive approach, it carefully examines the jurisprudence of the International Court of Justice, including separate and dissenting opinions, through a systematic analysis of relevant judgments and advisory opinions, with particular attention to cases involving diplomatic protection. By drawing legal data from primary judicial decisions and other authoritative scholarly sources, the study derives its conclusions from patterns identified within the Court’s practice concerning the role of domestic law. Conclusion Building on the approach of its predecessor, the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ), which treated domestic law as mere facts in the Certain German Interests in Polish Upper Silesia case, the jurisprudence of the International Court of Justice has nevertheless evolved. While the ICJ in its early decisions largely reaffirmed the Permanent Court’s position and asserted itself as an organ of the international legal order, it has gradually developed a more nuanced engagement with domestic law. Domestic law, as an independent and distinct legal system, has nonetheless influenced the development of international law and assisted the Court in fulfilling its judicial functions. Independent systems can exert mutual influence without compromising their autonomy. Domestic and international legal systems are therefore not merely coexisting regimes; they are complementary and interdependent, cooperating to enhance the public order of the international community. This interaction is particularly evident in cases concerning diplomatic protection, where the Court has engaged with domestic legal processes, most notably in determining nationality as a prerequisite for the exercise of diplomatic protection. Similarly, domestic law has been invoked as an interpretative element in relation to unilateral declarations of States and declarations accepting the Court’s compulsory jurisdiction. In such instances, the Court neither applies domestic law as a binding rule nor treats it as a mere factual matter. Rather, domestic law operates as a normatively relevant consideration within the Court’s international legal reasoning. Ultimately, a rigid distinction between domestic and international law proves untenable, as matters governed by one legal system may, in specific contexts, enter the normative domain of the other.

https://jlq.ut.ac.ir/article_105544_a9f9cd02a0f314c6e6c8394febfe91c2.pdf

University of Tehran Law Quarterly 2588-5618 55 4 2026 01 18 The Legal Nature of Contract: Reflections on the Autonomy of Contract Law The Legal Nature of Contract: Reflections on the Autonomy of Contract Law 605 629 105545 10.22059/jlq.2025.399612.1008016 FA Abdollah Rajabi Assistant Professor, Department of Private Law, Faculty of Law, Tehran University, Qom, Iran. Journal Article 2025 12 06 Introduction A persistent challenge in the legal domain concerns the lack of consistency in resolving contractual disputes. This inconsistency arises from divergent interpretations of contractual relations, particularly regarding how the law conceptualizes disputed agreements. The debate therefore centers on the legal understanding of contracts, as the adoption of a coherent interpretative framework is essential for the consistent resolution of disputes across diverse contractual contexts. Clarifying this issue enables the identification of the factors underlying discrepancies in judicial and arbitral decision-making. In this regard, the fulfillment of legal and judicial functions presupposes a precise understanding of the essence of contract law and the delineation of the elements that properly fall within its scope. Accordingly, the principal research questions are as follows: What constitutes contract law? What content does it encompass, and what are its foundations? Should contract law be regarded as an autonomous field of law, or does it merely follow the principles and methodology of other legal branches? More specifically, what perspective does Iranian law adopt toward contracts, and how does it conceptualize them? What is the nature of the legal rules governing contracts, what classifications do they fall under, and in what respects do they differ from other types of legal rules? Method Although both domestic and foreign scholarship has addressed these questions, existing studies have tended to provide fragmented responses and have not succeeded in offering a coherent justification of current Iranian legal practice in light of its doctrinal foundations. This study seeks to address the matter systematically, drawing on the philosophical underpinnings of contract law, Iran’s historical legal development, and achievements in international contract law, and judicial practice. The research approach combines doctrinal and theoretical analysis with comparative legal study. In addition to examining statutory provisions and judicial precedents, the study engages with scholarly theories and comparative perspectives, including English-language literature on contract law. By situating Iranian legal doctrine within a comparative framework, the study aims not only to describe but also, where necessary, to critically evaluate and analyze the subject. Conclusions Iranian contract law is deeply influenced by Islamic jurisprudence, yet it also reflects the imprint of Western legal traditions and historical transformations. The doctrinal foundation of Iranian civil law, shaped by jurisprudence, Roman law, and French positivism, emphasizes the notion of promise. Article 10 of the Civil Code, for instance, is premised on the theory of will, treating the contract as a product of mutual consent rather than an exchange of material interests. Nevertheless, contemporary legal practice also demonstrates the influence of utilitarian and realist approaches. Judicial reasoning often incorporates considerations of equitable exchange and economic expediency, which resonate with both modern legal thought and certain principles within Islamic law—such as rules addressing fraud (ghabn), defects, and similar doctrines. Thus, although the historical dominance of the promise theory persists, economic realities increasingly shape the practical application of contract law. This interaction produces a complex doctrinal landscape wherein neither a purely promissory nor a purely utilitarian conception suffices. A comprehensive understanding of contracts requires acknowledgment of all three dimensions: the autonomy of will, the normative structure of legal rules, and the economic balance of interests. From this perspective, judicial intervention is justified where the formation of will is defective, whereas in cases of valid and untainted consent, the contract retains its character as a binding promise. Introduction A persistent challenge in the legal domain concerns the lack of consistency in resolving contractual disputes. This inconsistency arises from divergent interpretations of contractual relations, particularly regarding how the law conceptualizes disputed agreements. The debate therefore centers on the legal understanding of contracts, as the adoption of a coherent interpretative framework is essential for the consistent resolution of disputes across diverse contractual contexts. Clarifying this issue enables the identification of the factors underlying discrepancies in judicial and arbitral decision-making. In this regard, the fulfillment of legal and judicial functions presupposes a precise understanding of the essence of contract law and the delineation of the elements that properly fall within its scope. Accordingly, the principal research questions are as follows: What constitutes contract law? What content does it encompass, and what are its foundations? Should contract law be regarded as an autonomous field of law, or does it merely follow the principles and methodology of other legal branches? More specifically, what perspective does Iranian law adopt toward contracts, and how does it conceptualize them? What is the nature of the legal rules governing contracts, what classifications do they fall under, and in what respects do they differ from other types of legal rules? Method Although both domestic and foreign scholarship has addressed these questions, existing studies have tended to provide fragmented responses and have not succeeded in offering a coherent justification of current Iranian legal practice in light of its doctrinal foundations. This study seeks to address the matter systematically, drawing on the philosophical underpinnings of contract law, Iran’s historical legal development, and achievements in international contract law, and judicial practice. The research approach combines doctrinal and theoretical analysis with comparative legal study. In addition to examining statutory provisions and judicial precedents, the study engages with scholarly theories and comparative perspectives, including English-language literature on contract law. By situating Iranian legal doctrine within a comparative framework, the study aims not only to describe but also, where necessary, to critically evaluate and analyze the subject. Conclusions Iranian contract law is deeply influenced by Islamic jurisprudence, yet it also reflects the imprint of Western legal traditions and historical transformations. The doctrinal foundation of Iranian civil law, shaped by jurisprudence, Roman law, and French positivism, emphasizes the notion of promise. Article 10 of the Civil Code, for instance, is premised on the theory of will, treating the contract as a product of mutual consent rather than an exchange of material interests. Nevertheless, contemporary legal practice also demonstrates the influence of utilitarian and realist approaches. Judicial reasoning often incorporates considerations of equitable exchange and economic expediency, which resonate with both modern legal thought and certain principles within Islamic law—such as rules addressing fraud (ghabn), defects, and similar doctrines. Thus, although the historical dominance of the promise theory persists, economic realities increasingly shape the practical application of contract law. This interaction produces a complex doctrinal landscape wherein neither a purely promissory nor a purely utilitarian conception suffices. A comprehensive understanding of contracts requires acknowledgment of all three dimensions: the autonomy of will, the normative structure of legal rules, and the economic balance of interests. From this perspective, judicial intervention is justified where the formation of will is defective, whereas in cases of valid and untainted consent, the contract retains its character as a binding promise.

https://jlq.ut.ac.ir/article_105545_767699fb175473ce684dea18f6855854.pdf

University of Tehran Law Quarterly 2588-5618 55 4 2026 01 18 A Comparative Analysis of Contractual Obligation in Light of the State’s Normative Power: Rereading the “Interpenetrated Obligation” Theory at the Intersection of Public and Private Law A Comparative Analysis of Contractual Obligation in Light of the State’s Normative Power: Rereading the “Interpenetrated Obligation” Theory at the Intersection of Public and Private Law 631 656 105546 10.22059/jlq.2026.399463.1008014 FA Mahdi Moradi Berelian Assistant Professor, Department of Public and International Law, Faculty of Law and Political Science, University of Mazandaran, Babolsar, Mazandaran, Iran. Mohammad Ghsem Tangestani Associate Professor, Department of International Law, Faculty of Law and Political Science, Kharazmi University, Tehran, Iran. Journal Article 2025 08 02 Introduction In Iranian law, contractual obligations have traditionally been analyzed through the lens of party autonomy, with legal duties largely regarded as the direct outcome of private agreement. This classical approach, shaped by nineteenth-century European contract theories—particularly French civil law—assumes that the individual will of the contracting parties alone suffices to create binding obligations. However, contemporary legal practice reveals that contracts operate at the intersection of private choice, public normative authority, and institutional mechanisms tasked with interpreting and enforcing obligations. Economic fluctuations, informational asymmetries, and concerns over social justice increasingly expose the limitations of purely voluntarist models. This study introduces the “Interpenetrated Obligation Theory,” a conceptual framework proposing that contractual obligations are inherently multi-layered and dynamic. According to this theory, obligations emerge from the ongoing interaction among three interdependent dimensions: the private will of the parties, the normative authority of the state, and institutional mechanisms that interpret, enforce, and adjust obligations in light of social justice and public policy. This approach addresses the limitations of classical voluntarist models, offering a richer understanding of how contracts operate within complex legal, social, and economic contexts. The central research question asks: How can contractual obligations be analyzed as a phenomenon shaped by both private autonomy and public normative authority? The study posits that obligations in Iranian law are neither purely private nor entirely reducible to state intervention; instead, they result from ongoing interaction among individual choice, institutional recognition, and normative regulation. Method This research employs a descriptive–analytical methodology with comparative legal analysis. The study proceeds in three stages: (i) a conceptual and theoretical review of both classical and contemporary frameworks, (ii) a comparative examination of contract law doctrines in France, Germany, and England, and (iii) a doctrinal and jurisprudential study of Iranian Supreme Court unification decisions , particularly the unification rulings issued between 2021–2025 (corresponding to 1400–1404 in the Iranian calendar). The descriptive stage traces the evolution of contractual obligation theories, from an exclusive focus on party autonomy to functional, institutional, and justice-oriented approaches. The analytical stage identifies gaps in Iranian legal scholarship and practice, highlighting the limitations of voluntarist approaches in capturing the dynamic interplay between private choice and public authority. The comparative analysis positions Iranian law within the broader European context, elucidating similarities and differences in the regulation of fairness, public order, and consumer protection. Conclusions Contractual obligations cannot be fully comprehended through a single lens—be it voluntarist, functionalist, or institutionalist. Rather, they arise from the ongoing interaction among private autonomy, public normative authority, and institutional enforcement mechanisms. Article 230 of the Iranian Civil Code and Supreme Court unification rulings demonstrate how judicial processes crystallize obligations while incorporating fairness, public order, and social justice. The Interpenetrated Obligation Theory provides a robust framework for reconceptualizing Iranian contract law, offering guidance for legislative reform, judicial reasoning, and regulatory oversight. It advocates a shift from a static, will-centered paradigm to a dynamic, multi-layered, and justice-oriented understanding of contractual obligations, better equipping Iranian law to confront contemporary economic, social, and institutional challenges. Introduction In Iranian law, contractual obligations have traditionally been analyzed through the lens of party autonomy, with legal duties largely regarded as the direct outcome of private agreement. This classical approach, shaped by nineteenth-century European contract theories—particularly French civil law—assumes that the individual will of the contracting parties alone suffices to create binding obligations. However, contemporary legal practice reveals that contracts operate at the intersection of private choice, public normative authority, and institutional mechanisms tasked with interpreting and enforcing obligations. Economic fluctuations, informational asymmetries, and concerns over social justice increasingly expose the limitations of purely voluntarist models. This study introduces the “Interpenetrated Obligation Theory,” a conceptual framework proposing that contractual obligations are inherently multi-layered and dynamic. According to this theory, obligations emerge from the ongoing interaction among three interdependent dimensions: the private will of the parties, the normative authority of the state, and institutional mechanisms that interpret, enforce, and adjust obligations in light of social justice and public policy. This approach addresses the limitations of classical voluntarist models, offering a richer understanding of how contracts operate within complex legal, social, and economic contexts. The central research question asks: How can contractual obligations be analyzed as a phenomenon shaped by both private autonomy and public normative authority? The study posits that obligations in Iranian law are neither purely private nor entirely reducible to state intervention; instead, they result from ongoing interaction among individual choice, institutional recognition, and normative regulation. Method This research employs a descriptive–analytical methodology with comparative legal analysis. The study proceeds in three stages: (i) a conceptual and theoretical review of both classical and contemporary frameworks, (ii) a comparative examination of contract law doctrines in France, Germany, and England, and (iii) a doctrinal and jurisprudential study of Iranian Supreme Court unification decisions , particularly the unification rulings issued between 2021–2025 (corresponding to 1400–1404 in the Iranian calendar). The descriptive stage traces the evolution of contractual obligation theories, from an exclusive focus on party autonomy to functional, institutional, and justice-oriented approaches. The analytical stage identifies gaps in Iranian legal scholarship and practice, highlighting the limitations of voluntarist approaches in capturing the dynamic interplay between private choice and public authority. The comparative analysis positions Iranian law within the broader European context, elucidating similarities and differences in the regulation of fairness, public order, and consumer protection. Conclusions Contractual obligations cannot be fully comprehended through a single lens—be it voluntarist, functionalist, or institutionalist. Rather, they arise from the ongoing interaction among private autonomy, public normative authority, and institutional enforcement mechanisms. Article 230 of the Iranian Civil Code and Supreme Court unification rulings demonstrate how judicial processes crystallize obligations while incorporating fairness, public order, and social justice. The Interpenetrated Obligation Theory provides a robust framework for reconceptualizing Iranian contract law, offering guidance for legislative reform, judicial reasoning, and regulatory oversight. It advocates a shift from a static, will-centered paradigm to a dynamic, multi-layered, and justice-oriented understanding of contractual obligations, better equipping Iranian law to confront contemporary economic, social, and institutional challenges.

https://jlq.ut.ac.ir/article_105546_ed86b43e08ce5a728e24022d8614f982.pdf

University of Tehran Law Quarterly 2588-5618 55 4 2026 01 18 Ethics-Based Judicial Interpretation in the Light of Textualism and Interpretivism Ethics-Based Judicial Interpretation in the Light of Textualism and Interpretivism 657 684 105547 10.22059/jlq.2026.366018.1007805 FA Mohammad Maleki Assistant Professor, Department of Private Law, Central Tehran Branch, Islamic Azad University, Tehran, Iran. Journal Article 2023 10 30 Introduction The ethical dimension of adjudication and the extent to which judges may moralize the law constitute one of the most fundamental and contested issues in contemporary jurisprudence. With the growing complexity of social relations and the emergence of novel public and private disputes, courts frequently encounter statutory texts that appear incomplete, ambiguous, morally deficient, or inadequate for delivering substantive justice. This gives rise to a central theoretical question: to what extent may—or must—a judge ethically shape the law through interpretation? Legal positivist and textualist approaches prioritize enacted law and maintain a strict separation between law and morality. From this perspective, judicial ethics are fulfilled through faithful adherence to legislative intent and textual meaning, even if the result is morally unsatisfactory. In contrast, instrumentalist and interpretivist approaches view law as a means to an end, permitting judges to incorporate moral principles into legal reasoning in order to achieve genuine judicial justice. The present article examines the possibility and limits of ethics-based judicial interpretation by analyzing two competing paradigms: textualist positivism and instrumentalist interpretivism. Its central thesis is that the legitimacy of judicial ethical intervention hinges on whether law is conceived as an end in itself (subject-centered textual authority) or as an instrument for realizing justice (means-oriented interpretive authority). Method This research employs a descriptive-analytical methodology grounded in doctrinal legal analysis and jurisprudential theory. Classical and contemporary theories associated with positivism, textualism, and interpretivism are examined to elucidate their foundational assumptions concerning judicial authority, ethics, and legal validity. Primary legal-philosophical texts, models of judicial reasoning, and theoretical debates on judicial discretion, morality, and interpretation constitute the core materials. The analysis is conceptual and normative rather than empirical, seeking to identify the theoretical locus of each school regarding judicial ethics. Theoretical sampling focuses on representative doctrines within positivist-textualist and instrumentalist-interpretivist traditions. Textualist positivism is analyzed through principles such as textual objectivity, separation of law and morality, and prohibition of judicial moral creativity. Instrumentalist interpretivism is explored through purposive reasoning, rational interpretation, and moral coherence. Given the theoretical nature of the study, precision is achieved through conceptual clarification, internal coherence, and fidelity to original frameworks. Analytical strength derives from systematic comparison and clear demarcation between the paradigms. The study integrates normative legal theory with analytical jurisprudence, combining descriptive exposition of doctrines with evaluative reasoning on their implications for judicial ethics and justice. Conclusion The findings demonstrate that the possibility of ethics-based judicial interpretation is fundamentally contingent upon the underlying conception of law. From the textualist-positivist standpoint, law constitutes an autonomous normative system whose validity is independent of moral content. Justice is presumed rather than substantively realized. The judge’s role is confined to applying enacted law, with ethical reasoning excluded from interpretation. This position is defended on grounds of preventing judicial dictatorship, preserving legal certainty, avoiding normative disorder, and safeguarding legislative supremacy. Judicial moralization of law is thus impermissible, and the judiciary is characterized as the “servant of the legislator” (‘abd al-muqannin). In contrast, instrumentalist interpretivism conceives law as a means for achieving genuine judicial justice. Legal authority is purposive rather than intrinsic, and statutory meaning emerges through interpretation informed by rationality, social evolution, and moral principles. Where provisions lack ethical substance or fail to address new realities, judges are permitted—and indeed obligated—to interpret law by reference to rational social practices (sīrat al-‘uqalā’), customary understanding, societal transformations, judicial exigencies, legal metaphors, and the instrumental function of norms. Within this framework, ethics-based interpretation is not judicial overreach but a necessary corrective mechanism. The judge ceases to be a passive executor and becomes an ethical collaborator assisting the lawmaker in realizing justice. Accordingly, the judiciary is reconceived as a savior and supporter of the legal system rather than a potential threat to its integrity. Ultimately, ethical judicial interpretation is neither inherently legitimate nor illegitimate; its validity depends on the governing theoretical paradigm concerning the nature of law and judicial authority. Recognizing this distinction is crucial for resolving ongoing debates on judicial ethics, discretion, and the moral boundaries of legal interpretation. Introduction The ethical dimension of adjudication and the extent to which judges may moralize the law constitute one of the most fundamental and contested issues in contemporary jurisprudence. With the growing complexity of social relations and the emergence of novel public and private disputes, courts frequently encounter statutory texts that appear incomplete, ambiguous, morally deficient, or inadequate for delivering substantive justice. This gives rise to a central theoretical question: to what extent may—or must—a judge ethically shape the law through interpretation? Legal positivist and textualist approaches prioritize enacted law and maintain a strict separation between law and morality. From this perspective, judicial ethics are fulfilled through faithful adherence to legislative intent and textual meaning, even if the result is morally unsatisfactory. In contrast, instrumentalist and interpretivist approaches view law as a means to an end, permitting judges to incorporate moral principles into legal reasoning in order to achieve genuine judicial justice. The present article examines the possibility and limits of ethics-based judicial interpretation by analyzing two competing paradigms: textualist positivism and instrumentalist interpretivism. Its central thesis is that the legitimacy of judicial ethical intervention hinges on whether law is conceived as an end in itself (subject-centered textual authority) or as an instrument for realizing justice (means-oriented interpretive authority). Method This research employs a descriptive-analytical methodology grounded in doctrinal legal analysis and jurisprudential theory. Classical and contemporary theories associated with positivism, textualism, and interpretivism are examined to elucidate their foundational assumptions concerning judicial authority, ethics, and legal validity. Primary legal-philosophical texts, models of judicial reasoning, and theoretical debates on judicial discretion, morality, and interpretation constitute the core materials. The analysis is conceptual and normative rather than empirical, seeking to identify the theoretical locus of each school regarding judicial ethics. Theoretical sampling focuses on representative doctrines within positivist-textualist and instrumentalist-interpretivist traditions. Textualist positivism is analyzed through principles such as textual objectivity, separation of law and morality, and prohibition of judicial moral creativity. Instrumentalist interpretivism is explored through purposive reasoning, rational interpretation, and moral coherence. Given the theoretical nature of the study, precision is achieved through conceptual clarification, internal coherence, and fidelity to original frameworks. Analytical strength derives from systematic comparison and clear demarcation between the paradigms. The study integrates normative legal theory with analytical jurisprudence, combining descriptive exposition of doctrines with evaluative reasoning on their implications for judicial ethics and justice. Conclusion The findings demonstrate that the possibility of ethics-based judicial interpretation is fundamentally contingent upon the underlying conception of law. From the textualist-positivist standpoint, law constitutes an autonomous normative system whose validity is independent of moral content. Justice is presumed rather than substantively realized. The judge’s role is confined to applying enacted law, with ethical reasoning excluded from interpretation. This position is defended on grounds of preventing judicial dictatorship, preserving legal certainty, avoiding normative disorder, and safeguarding legislative supremacy. Judicial moralization of law is thus impermissible, and the judiciary is characterized as the “servant of the legislator” (‘abd al-muqannin). In contrast, instrumentalist interpretivism conceives law as a means for achieving genuine judicial justice. Legal authority is purposive rather than intrinsic, and statutory meaning emerges through interpretation informed by rationality, social evolution, and moral principles. Where provisions lack ethical substance or fail to address new realities, judges are permitted—and indeed obligated—to interpret law by reference to rational social practices (sīrat al-‘uqalā’), customary understanding, societal transformations, judicial exigencies, legal metaphors, and the instrumental function of norms. Within this framework, ethics-based interpretation is not judicial overreach but a necessary corrective mechanism. The judge ceases to be a passive executor and becomes an ethical collaborator assisting the lawmaker in realizing justice. Accordingly, the judiciary is reconceived as a savior and supporter of the legal system rather than a potential threat to its integrity. Ultimately, ethical judicial interpretation is neither inherently legitimate nor illegitimate; its validity depends on the governing theoretical paradigm concerning the nature of law and judicial authority. Recognizing this distinction is crucial for resolving ongoing debates on judicial ethics, discretion, and the moral boundaries of legal interpretation.

https://jlq.ut.ac.ir/article_105547_c480311b5b18c323344f306aa8154a55.pdf