دانشگاه تهران مطالعات حقوق خصوصی 2588-5618 56 1 2026 04 21 An Analysis of Paragraph 7, Article 96 of the Law on the Protection of Industrial Property Regarding the Protection of Trademarks for Dissimilar Goods and Services: A Comparative Study of the Legal Systems of the United States and the European Union واکاوی بند 7 مادة 96 قانون حمایت از مالکیت صنعتی در خصوص حمایت از علائم تجاری در رابطه با کالاها و خدمات غیرمشابه در پرتو مطالعۀ تطبیقی آمریکا و اتحادیۀ اروپا 13 37 107532 10.22059/jlq.2026.399472.1008015 FA سعید حبیبا استاد گروه حقوق خصوصی و اسلامی دانشکدۀ حقوق و علوم سیاسی دانشگاه تهران، تهران، ایران. امیر ناظری دانشجوی دکتری حقوق نفت و گاز، دانشکدۀ حقوق و علوم سیاسی دانشگاه تهران، تهران، ایران. Journal Article 2025 07 26 Introduction The protection of trademarks in relation to non-identical goods and services represents one of the most controversial expansions of modern trademark law. Traditionally, trademark protection was grounded in the principle of specialty, under which exclusive rights were limited to specific goods and services for which a mark was registered. This principle is rooted in the core function of trademarks, namely the indication of commercial origin and the prevention of consumer confusion. However, since the mid-twentieth century, comparative legal systems have gradually expanded trademark protection beyond identical or similar goods, particularly in relation to well-known marks. Both the United States and the European Union have developed a dilution doctrine that allows protection of famous marks even in the absence of confusion regarding origin. In contrast, Article 96(7) of the Iranian Industrial Property Protection Act introduces a broader framework, extending protection to both famous and non-famous marks in relation to dissimilar goods and services, based on two alternative grounds: likelihood of confusion or harm to the prior trademark owner. This essay adopts a descriptive-analytical method and comparative approach to examine whether this provision aligns with the economic and doctrinal foundations of modern trademark law, particularly in the United States and the European Union. Method This research is conducted using a descriptive-analytic methodology combined with a comparative legal approach. The study relies on library-based sources, including doctrinal writings, judicial precedents, and legislative frameworks from the United States, European Union, and Iran. First, the paper examines the historical evolution of trademark protection for non-identical goods in U.S. law, focusing on the development of dilution by blurring and tarnishment and the expansion of the sponsorship confusion doctrine. Key scholarly contributions and landmark cases are analyzed to clarify the conceptual boundaries of protection. Second, the European Union's approach is reviewed, particularly under Directives and regulations, highlighting the concept of unfair advantage as distinct from dilution-based harm. Finally, the Iranian provision is critically evaluated against these comparative standards to determine whether its scope is consistent with the economic rationale of trademark protection or leads to an unjustified expansion of exclusive rights. Conclusion The comparative analysis demonstrates that in both the U.S and the European Union, protection of trademarks in relation to dissimilar goods is strictly limited to well-known or reputed marks. Such protection is primarily justified under dilution theory or, in limited cases, sponsorship confusion. Importantly, non-famous marks do not benefit from protection against use on unrelated goods, as such protection lacks doctrinal and economic justification. In contrast, Article 96(7) appears to extend protection beyond these established boundaries. The provision, as literally interpreted, allows both well-known marks to be protected against use on dissimilar goods based on either consumer confusion or harm to the trademark owner's interests. This interpretation significantly expands the scope of trademark rights and deviates from comparative legal standards. The study concludes that such an expansive reading is inconsistent with the principles of trademark law and may lead to unjustified monopolization of market symbols without consumer benefits. Therefore, a restrictive interpretation is proposed. The first interpretive approach suggests replacing the disjunctive "or" with a conjunctive "and", thereby limiting protection to well-known marks that are both recognized and registered. The second approach introduces an implicit limitation restricting harm to interest protection exclusively to well-known marks. Ultimately, the article recommends legislative or regulatory clarification to align Article 96(7) with internationally accepted standards, ensuring a balanced equilibrium between trademark exclusivity and public domain interests. بند 7 مادة 96 قانون حمایت از مالکیت صنعتی در مقام وضع یکی از شرایط سلبی ثبت علامت تجاری، امکان ثبت علامت را در فروضی خاص، یعنی حالتی که آن علامت عین یا شبیه علامتی باشد که قبلاً برای کالا و خدمات دیگری معروف شده یا به ثبت رسیده مشروط بر اینکه موجب گمراهی عموم شود و یا به منافع مالک علامت قبلی لطمه وارد آورد، ممنوع اعلام کرده است. قاعدتاً وقتی امکان ثبت علامتی به‌سبب مخالفت با حقوق مالک علامت دیگری وجود ندارد، استفادۀ بدون اجازه از آن علامت نیز ممنوع و مصداق نقض است. بنابراین از ظاهر بند مزبور استنباط می‌شود علائم تجاری غیرمعروف برای کالاها و خدمات غیرمشابه، هم به‌سبب احتمال گمراهی مصرف‌کنندگان و هم به‌دلیل احتمال لطمه به منافع مالک مورد حمایت قرار می‌گیرند. پژوهش حاضر تلاش می‌کند با روش تحلیلی – توصیفی و رویکرد کتابخانه‌ای و در بطن مطالعه‌ای تطبیقی در حقوق آمریکا و اتحادیۀ اروپا نشان دهد این ظاهر هیچ‌گونه مطابقتی با مقتضیات حقوق مالکیت صنعتی و منافع اقتصادی کشور ندارد و تلاش می‌شود ضمن ارائۀ تفسیرهایی منطبق با روح حاکم بر حقوق علائم تجاری، آثار منفی و مخرب این مقرره تا حد امکان کاهش داده شود.

https://jlq.ut.ac.ir/article_107532_dc44b803581282eeaa92ea1c2a9d384b.pdf

دانشگاه تهران مطالعات حقوق خصوصی 2588-5618 56 1 2026 04 21 Interpreting the Intent of Contracting Parties in Cases of Ambiguity or Uncertainty Concerning the Selected Version or Term of Incoterms: A Critical Review of Selected Iranian Judgments and Arbitral Awards تفسیر ارادۀ متعاقدین در موارد تردید یا ابهام در نسخه یا اصطلاح انتخاب‌شده از اینکوترمز؛ نقد و تحلیل چند رأی قضایی و داوری ایران 39 60 107533 10.22059/jlq.2026.395516.1007993 FA محسن صادقی دانشیار گروه حقوق خصوصی و اسلامی، دانشکدۀ حقوق و علوم سیاسی، دانشگاه تهران، تهران، ایران. 0000-0002-0099-3132 مبینا برهانی دانش‌آموختۀ کارشناسی ارشد حقوق حمل‌ونقل تجاری، دانشکدۀ حقوق و علوم سیاسی، دانشگاه تهران تهران، ایران. Journal Article 2025 05 28 Introduction In the fast-paced world of international trade, the need for a clear and precise interpretation of the parties’ intentions in contracts incorporating Incoterms rules is increasingly pressing. The Incoterms rules, developed by the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC), are intended solely to clarify responsibilities, costs, and the transfer of risk in commercial transactions. Nevertheless, gaps in the articulation of specific Incoterms versions and terms have led to ambiguities in interpreting contract provisions and divergent decisions by arbitral tribunals and judicial bodies. The core issue addressed in this article is that, in many contracts, although the parties agree to incorporate Incoterms, they do not specify the applicable version or any particular term, or they use expressions that have been removed or replaced in official versions. This legal uncertainty gives rise to disputes over the performance and interpretation of contractual obligations. Therefore, the central research question is: in cases of doubt or ambiguity regarding an Incoterms term or version, how can the parties' true intention be accurately interpreted? The hypothesis of the study posits that the interpretation of the parties' intention must be grounded in general principles of contract law—such as the principle of effectiveness (favor contractus) and the principle of good faith—along with judicial precedents and international trade customs. Where possible, analogous or substitute terms should be applied, and nullification of the clause or the entire contract should not be treated as the default solution. Method This article employs a qualitative approach, using descriptive-critical analysis, to examine four major scenarios involving interpretive ambiguities. In the first scenario, the parties have merely agreed to apply Incoterms without specifying a version. Based on the authors’ analysis and arbitral precedents, the prevailing rule is that the version in force at the time of contract conclusion (typically the most recent version) shall apply unless contrary evidence is presented. In the second scenario, a version is specified, but no particular term is selected. Here, the interpretive approach favors selecting the term that imposes the least obligation on the seller (e.g., EXW), unless there is evidence of an implied intention to adopt another term. In this context as well, arbitral and judicial decisions generally support a minimalist interpretation in favor of the principle of non-excess and the presumption of innocence. The third scenario involves agreements that cite Incoterms 2020 but use outdated terms such as DAT or DEQ, which have been removed from the latest version. If the selected term has an equivalent or successor in the new version (e.g., the replacement of DAT with DPU), substitution should be made. However, if the term has been entirely abolished and cannot be equivalently replaced, the agreement will be deemed inconsistent and ineffective—unless trade usage or specific evidence within the case supports the position of one of the parties. In the fourth scenario, a specific term (e.g., FOB) is selected, but the contract contains an implied condition that mirrors the effects of another term (e.g., DDP). In such cases, if a "minimum common understanding" of the parties’ intent can be discerned, the principal term should not be disregarded; rather, an expanded interpretation should be applied only where the contract overlaps with the other term. This approach aligns with legal maxims, such as favor contractus (prefer combining over discarding whenever possible), and with judicial practice and commercial realities. Conclusion The findings of the research indicate that a principled interpretation of the contracting parties’ intent must align with the underlying philosophy of Incoterms—namely, to reduce transaction costs, prevent disputes, and facilitate contractual relations. The article advocates that, in cases of ambiguity, instead of nullifying a clause or term, the interpretation most consistent with the parties’ intent and conduct should be preferred. It also recommends that the ICC include a section titled “Interpretative Guidelines in Cases of Silence or Conflict” in the Incoterms text, to provide arbitral and judicial authorities with a shared and authoritative interpretive framework. In conclusion, this research not only fills a significant gap in the Iranian legal literature on the interpretation of Incoterms—particularly in relation to arbitral decisions—but also offers practical guidance for traders, arbitrators, and contract drafters. It is hoped that this approach will contribute to enhanced legal certainty and a reduction of commercial disputes at both national and international levels. هرچند فلسفۀ وضع اینکوترمز، کمک به شفافیت بیشتر و یکنواخت‌سازی رویۀ حقوقی حاکم بر تخصیص ریسک، مسئولیت و هزینه به بایع یا مشتری در قرارداد بیع و پیشگیری از بروز اختلاف در این سه حوزه بوده است، اما سکوت مقررات اینکوترمز حتی در آخرین نسخۀ آن یعنی نسخۀ 2020 در برخی زمینه‌ها، سبب بروز اختلاف میان متعاقدین و تشتت در آرای قضایی و داوری شده است. اینجاست که نحوۀ تفسیر ارادۀ متعاقدین در خصوص اصطلاح انتخاب‌شده از اینکوترمز می‌تواند راهگشا باشد. از آنجا که این موضوع کاربردی در ادبیات حقوقی ما مورد توجه خاص قرار نگرفته و منابع علمی شکل‌گرفته در خصوص اینکوترمز اغلب به بیان مفهوم و مفاد ترم‌ها محدود شده، از این‌رو تحقیق حاضر برای رفع نسبی این خلأ تحقیقاتی و ارائۀ راهکارهای روشن به متعاقدین و مرجع رسیدگی، کوشیده است تا با روش کیفی و با رویکرد توصیفی-تحلیلی ضمن بهره‌گیری از ابزار کتابخانه‌ای و همراه با نقد و تحلیل چند رأی قضایی و داوری، به این پرسش اساسی پاسخ دهد که در مقام تردید یا ابهام در ترم انتخابی مدنظر متعاقدین می‌تواند ما را در تفسیر بهینه یاری کند. نوشتار پیش رو، در قالب چهار بخش عرضه می‌شود و در هر بخش، یکی از مصادیق مهم ابهام بررسی و بر مبنای آن، به نقد و تحلیل یک رأی قضایی یا داوری مرتبط پرداخته می‌شود و در پایان، راهکارهای روشن به مراجع حل اختلاف و متعاقدین پیشنهاد می‌شود.

https://jlq.ut.ac.ir/article_107533_cca99d79c791de36fc7963a7008a1ca1.pdf

دانشگاه تهران مطالعات حقوق خصوصی 2588-5618 56 1 2026 04 21 An Analysis of the Unilateral Promise to Perform a Natural Obligation Considering the 2016 Amendments to the French Civil Code تحلیل وعدۀ یکجانبۀ اجرای تعهد طبیعی در پرتو اصلاحات ۲۰۱۶ قانون مدنی فرانسه 61 86 107534 10.22059/jlq.2026.403510.1008036 FA محمد عابدی دانشیار گروه حقوق خصوصی، دانشکدۀ حقوق و علوم سیاسی، دانشگاه فردوسی مشهد، مشهد، ایران. محمدتقی نادی دانشجوی دکتری حقوق خصوصی، دانشکدۀ حقوق و علوم سیاسی، دانشگاه فردوسی مشهد، مشهد، ایران. 0009-0002-7635-8706 Journal Article 2025 10 01 Introduction Natural obligation in contract law is an institution in which a person feels a moral duty toward another, but this obligation is not recognized by law and therefore does not carry a legal claim or be enforced by civil action. Natural obligation is a traditional and still controversial concept in private law; recent reforms to the French Civil Code have partly addressed it. Natural obligation is not comprehensively defined in the Iranian Civil Code, and the law addresses only one of its effects; hence, the concept and nature of natural obligation remain an important challenge in Iran’s legal system. In practice, a natural obligation may fall within the sphere of civil law and become non-recoverable through a promise or voluntary payment. Article 266 of the Iranian Civil Code does not address how to convert a natural obligation into a civil obligation, which raises doubts about the validity of a unilateral promise of a natural obligation. Notably, unlike Iranian law, French law—pursuant to Article 1100 of the Civil Code—considers the promise to perform a moral obligation as a new source of obligations. The 2016 reforms of French law brought law and ethics closer at the point of natural obligations and elevated the unilateral promise to perform a natural obligation from an obscure, obsolete institution to one with a clear and coherent legal function. In that system, the source of enforceability for the unilateral promise to perform a moral obligation is not merely subsequent material performance, but the promise itself, which, once realized under the necessary conditions, becomes enforceable. There, the promise serves as a link between ethics and law by operating within the domain of non‑enforceable obligations (moral or conscience‑based obligations, time‑barred debts, and the like). Under general contract rules, a unilateral promise does not create any obligation, but the question is under what conditions a promise to perform a moral obligation produces the desired legal effects. Accordingly, the principal question of this study is: what are the necessary conditions for the validity of a unilateral promise to perform a natural obligation, and what effects does it produce? This paper aims to identify the conditions required for a promise to create a legal obligation from a natural obligation, and to examine its effects. It argues that a unilateral promise to perform a natural obligation, provided that conditions such as the intention to be legally bound, conformity with public order and good morals, and free will are met, may be recognized as a source of enforceable legal obligations and as a starting point for respecting legitimate expectations in society. Method The research uses a descriptive‑analytical method, reporting and describing data relevant to the study and analyzing the subject in light of the Iranian legal situation. Given the long tradition of the subject in French law and its recent statutory reform, a comparative examination of French law, with an emphasis on its modern legislative amendments, has been conducted. Conclusions This study, by reviewing Iran's legal status and comparing it with the French legal system, considers a unilateral promise to perform a natural obligation, subject to certain conditions, as a source of enforceable obligations. Likewise, as the French Civil Code, in Articles 1301‑1 and 1302‑2, distinguishes between civil and natural obligations and applies the principle of non‑recoverability to delineate a relatively precise scope for the performance of natural obligations, the Iranian legislator should amend Article 266 of the Civil Code to expressly regulate the formation and effects of natural obligations with regard to promissory performance. The phrase “at the debtor’s discretion” in Article 266 indicates the need to recognize the prior existence of a natural debt and the sense of obligation toward it, and it manifests the necessity for the debtor’s knowledge and awareness of the nature of the debt. Until statutory reform and new rules are adopted, a desirable interpretation should be drawn from the traditional provisions to mitigate existing challenges as much as possible. Moreover, by a broader interpretation of the term “performance,” the conversion of a natural obligation into a legal obligation need not be limited to payment of the debt; payment is merely the predominant mode, and a promise to perform should stand alongside it. تعهدات طبیعی به‌عنوان نهادی کهن که ریشه در حقوق روم دارد، در نظام حقوقی فرانسه و ایران پذیرفته شده است. مادۀ ۲۶۶ قانون مدنی ایران بی‌آنکه اصطلاح «تعهد طبیعی» را به‌کار برد، اثر عدم استردادِ وفای داوطلبانهِ دین غیرقابل مطالبه از حیث قانونی را پذیرفته است. تعهد طبیعی، به‌سبب ابهام در مفهوم و قلمرو آن، در رویۀ قضایی ایران مهجور مانده و گاه با هبه یا ایفای ناروا خلط می‌شود. اصلاحات ۲۰۱۶ قانون مدنی فرانسه با تغییر جایگاه تعهد طبیعی از مبحث وفای به عهد به ایفای ناروا، نقش «وعدۀ یکجانبۀ اجرای تعهد طبیعی» را به‌عنوان منبع تعهد مدنی مستقل تقویت کرد و مرز آن را با ایفای ناروا روشن ساخت. این مقاله، نخست سیر تاریخی و مبانی نوین تعهد طبیعی در فرانسه را با تأکید بر وعدۀ یکجانبه و شرایط اعتبار آن تحلیل کرده و سپس آثار عملی آن را با دکترین و رویۀ اخیر تبیین می‌کند. در این پژوهش نحوۀ اعمال وعدۀ اجرای تعهد با وضعیت کنونی قانون مدنی ایران مورد بحث قرار گرفته و تأثیر سایر مقررات بر آن بررسی شده است. در پایان، به‌منظور اصلاح مادۀ ۲۶۶ قانون مدنی ایران بر مبنای الگوی تقنینی مبتنی بر تجربۀ نظام حقوقی فرانسه، زمینۀ تعریف روشن، به رسمیت شناختن وعدۀ اجرای تعهدات طبیعی، مرزبندی با ایفای ناروا و سازوکارهای ضدتقلب را مورد بررسی و پیشنهاد قرار می‌دهد. این اصلاحات می‌تواند به ارتقای قطعیت، انصاف و کارایی در نظام تعهدات ایران بینجامد.

https://jlq.ut.ac.ir/article_107534_60903c949ae973344e713f28e063f50e.pdf

دانشگاه تهران مطالعات حقوق خصوصی 2588-5618 56 1 2026 04 21 The Interest Theory as the Basis for the Rights of the Deceased نظریه منفعت، مبنای ‌پذیرش‌ حق برای درگذشتگان 87 116 107535 10.22059/jlq.2026.386455.1007962 FA محمود کاظمی دانشیار گروه حقوق خصوصی و اسلامی دانشکدۀ حقوق و علوم سیاسی، دانشگاه تهران، تهران، ایران، 0000-0001-6528-7338 محمدسعید ساجدی دانش‌آموختۀ دکتری حقوق خصوصی دانشکدۀ حقوق و علوم سیاسی، دانشگاه تهران، تهران، ایران، Journal Article 2024 12 03 Introduction The question of whether deceased persons can possess rights has long been among the most challenging issues in legal philosophy and moral theory. Traditional legal systems generally assume that legal personality ends with death; therefore, a deceased individual can no longer hold rights or obligations. This assumption is reflected in many legal systems, including Iranian law, where legal capacity is usually understood to terminate upon death. However, despite the formal end of legal personality, many contemporary legal systems continue to recognize and protect certain interests associated with deceased persons. Examples include the protection of bodily integrity after death, respect for burial wishes, enforcement of wills, preservation of reputation, and the continuation of moral rights in intellectual property. The persistence of these protections poses an important theoretical problem: if the deceased no longer exist as legal persons, on what basis can these protections be justified? In response, legal philosophers have proposed various theories concerning the nature and foundation of rights. Two of the most influential approaches are the Will Theory and the Interest Theory. According to the Will Theory, rights are grounded in the autonomy and freedom of the right-holder and require the capacity to exercise choice or control over duties. In contrast, the Interest Theory argues that rights exist primarily to protect significant interests or benefits belonging to an individual. This article focuses on the Interest Theory as the most convincing basis for recognizing the rights of the deceased. According to this theory, rights are justified whenever an individual possesses interests important enough to impose duties upon others. Some human interests persist beyond biological death, such as interests in reputation, dignity, testamentary wishes, bodily integrity, and symbolic legacy. Consequently, the deceased may still be regarded as holders of certain rights. The theory therefore expands the category of right-holders beyond living human beings and acknowledges that some interests survive the end of physical life. The article also distinguishes between traditional and modern interpretations of the Interest Theory. Classical utilitarian thinkers such as Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill primarily justified posthumous protections on the grounds of social utility and the prevention of harm to living persons. Modern theorists, including Joseph Raz, Matthew Kramer, Neil MacCormick, and Daniel Sperling, have developed broader approaches that recognize the independent moral relevance of deceased persons themselves. These scholars emphasize continuing interests, symbolic existence, and the deceased’s ongoing membership in the moral community of humanity. The main objective of this study is to explain how the Interest Theory justifies posthumous rights and to demonstrate that it provides a stronger foundation for the rights of the deceased than competing theories, especially the Will Theory. Methodology This research employs a descriptive-analytical method based on legal philosophy, ethics, and comparative jurisprudence. The research also adopts a comparative legal approach by examining examples from Iranian law and broader legal systems. Conclusions The study concludes that the Interest Theory provides the most persuasive philosophical and legal basis for recognizing rights of the deceased. Unlike the Will Theory, which depends on autonomy and the ability to exercise choice, the Interest Theory focuses on protecting significant interests. Since many human interests survive death, the end of biological life does not necessarily eliminate all grounds for rights. The research demonstrates that deceased persons may continue to possess interests in reputation, dignity, bodily integrity, testamentary wishes, and symbolic identity. Harm inflicted on these interests may undermine values central to the person’s life and identity. Furthermore, the deceased remain symbolically connected to society through memory, legacy, family relations, and cultural identity. In this sense, they continue to belong to the moral community of humanity even after death. The article also concludes that modern interpretations of the Interest Theory are more successful than classical utilitarian approaches in explaining posthumous rights. While traditional theorists primarily justified these rights on the grounds of benefits to living persons, modern theorists recognize the deceased themselves as morally relevant subjects. Concepts such as symbolic existence and continuing moral membership provide a stronger ethical basis for legal protection after death. Nevertheless, posthumous rights are not absolute or unlimited. Their duration and scope depend on the nature of the relevant interests and the extent to which those interests remain socially meaningful. Some rights, such as protection of reputation or moral rights in intellectual property, may endure for a long period, whereas others may gradually fade over time. Ultimately, the Interest Theory adeptly broadens the conventional scope of legal rights by acknowledging that certain human interests transcend corporeal existence. Within this paradigm, the deceased are perceived not merely as subjects of reverence but as ongoing possessors of morally and legally substantial interests meriting safeguarding. در خصوص مبنای پذیرش حق برای درگذشتگان به لحاظ فلسفی وحقوقی اختلاف نظرهای زیادی وجود دارد. در این زمینه به طور سنتی دو نظریه انتخاب(اراده) و منفعت مطرح بوده است. هدف از این نوشتار بررسی چرایی پذیرش حقوق درگذشتگان بر بنیاد نظریه منفعت است. مطابق این نظریه، چون فرد درگذشته دارای منافع است، پس برای حمایت و تضمین آن منافع، باید ازحقوقی برخوردار باشد. این نظریه با توسعه دایره صاحبان حق، قلمرو حقوق را مختص انسان زنده ندانسته و بیان می‌دارد که منافعی وجود دارند که وجود آنها طولانی‌تر از مدت حیات شخص است و دارنده‌ این منافع، از حقوقی برخوردار است که از تمام یا برخی از این منافع حمایت می‌کند؛ البته این حقوق به اندازه زمانی که شخص زنده بوده، نیست و بسته به نوع منفعت و محتوای حقوق موردنظر، ممکن است در مدت زمان طولانی‌تر یا کوتاه تری وجود داشته و مورد حمایت باشد. این نظریه در سیر تحولی خود به نظریه «وجود نمادین» منتهی و موسوم شده است.

https://jlq.ut.ac.ir/article_107535_6ccb73a67fec2167a61596a01344decb.pdf

دانشگاه تهران مطالعات حقوق خصوصی 2588-5618 56 1 2026 04 21 The Foundation of Human Legal Personality and the Feasibility of Extending It to Animals بنیاد شخصیت حقوقی انسان و امکان‌سنجی شمول آن بر حیوانات 117 144 107536 10.22059/jlq.2026.401836.1008027 FA اسماعیل کشاورز صفی‌ئی استادیار گروه حقوق دانشکدۀ علوم انسانی دانشگاه آزاد اسلامی، قزوین، ایران. Journal Article 2025 09 05 Introduction One of the fundamental and determining institutions in the structure of legal systems is the concept of legal personality. In a way, the skeleton of any legal system can be considered the concept of legal personality. According to a long-standing tradition, humans have been defined in the legal framework as persons. In contrast, other non-human entities have been identified as other concepts, such as objects or property. With the progress of societies and economic and social changes, the concept of legal personality and its included instances have undergone transformation. This includes the emergence of companies, offices, and non-governmental organizations, which led to the classification of legal personality into real (natural) and legal (artificial) persons. With the emergence of environmental changes and the growing tendency to protect animals and other natural phenomena on the one hand, and advances in robotics and artificial intelligence on the other, the issue of recognizing non-human entities as subjects of rights and as having legal personality has expanded more than ever. Movements such as animal rights and nature rights have taken firm steps towards recognizing non-human living entities as legal persons with rights. What has received less attention in the meantime is the identification of the foundations of human legal personality and the feasibility of recognizing these foundations in the case of animals and manifestations of nature. Research conducted in domestic works so far has focused on animal rights, and there is no work that examines the foundations of human legal personality and the feasibility of animals having legal personality. Accordingly, in this innovative and pioneering research, we seek to identify these foundations in humans and assess the capacity of non-human entities to enjoy these fundamental components. Method The research was conducted in a descriptive-analytical manner. The required sources and data were collected through library research and by consulting websites and reputable domestic and foreign databases. Conclusion The traditional (orthodox) theory of legal personality includes a rights/duties-based approach that attributes legal personality to entities with the capacity to hold rights and/or duties. This approach, from the past to the present, across all legal systems influenced by the two theories of benefit and will, has considered only humans and human-created institutions (such as companies, offices, and non-governmental organizations) worthy of legal personality. In the legal works of traditional theories, two indicators have been introduced to identify legal personality: legalism and realism. According to legalism, legal personality is a title created by law, and the legislator can grant it to any entity he deems necessary, based on interests. Therefore, being human and possessing human characteristics do not necessarily entail legal personality. In contrast, realists believe that the existence of certain primarily human-centered characteristics (such as intelligence, will, self-awareness, and holiness) is the basis for having legal personality. However, in recent decades, with the expansion of movements to protect the rights of animals and natural phenomena, the traditional, anthropocentric foundations of legal personality have been reinterpreted and revised. The design of a Bundle Theory legal personality by Visa Korki, emphasizing the ability to be placed in certain legal situations, as well as the nature-centric reinterpretation of the theories of benefit and will, has paved the way for the gradual acceptance of legal personality for animals. In addition, among the indicators for identifying legal personality, the legality indicator, by adopting a non-human-centered approach and emphasizing the legislator's authority in determining legal personality, is more appropriate for recognizing the legal personality of animals. Meanwhile, the nature-centered reading of the realist index and the acknowledgment that animals (at least some animals such as primates and dolphins) possess human mental characteristics (such as will, intelligence, and emotional perception of pleasure and pain) provide a suitable basis for recognizing the legal personality of animals. بنابر نظریۀ سنتی، شخصیت حقوقی به موجودیت‌هایی اطلاق می‌شود که دارای حقوق و/یا تکالیف باشند یا توانایی برخورداری از حق و /یا تکلیف را داشته باشند. این موجودیت از دیرباز تاکنون بر پایۀ نظریۀ منفعت یا نظریۀ اراده، صرفاً به انسان‌ها و یا نهادهای حقوقی تأسیس‌شده توسط انسان اختصاص داده شده است. در مقابل نظریه خوشه‌ای با بازخوانی غیرانسان-محور از نظریه منفعت و اراده، امکان شناسایی حیوانات و برخی مظاهر طبیعی (نظیر رودخانه‌ها) را به‌عنوان موجودات صاحب حق و برخوردار از شخصیت حقوقی فراهم کرده است. شخصیت حقوقی بر پایۀ دو شاخص اصلی قانونی‌گرایی واقعی‌گرایی شناسایی می‌شود. بر مبنای قانونی‌گرایی، هر موجودیتی صرف‌نظر از ویژگی‌های واقعی، به محض شناسایی رسمی و معتبر از سوی یک مرجع قانونی صلاحیتدار، دارای شخصیت حقوقی خواهد بود. در مقابل واقعی‌گرایی شناسایی شخصیت حقوقی برای هر موجودیتی را منوط به برخورداری از برخی ویژگی‌های واقعی (نظیر اراده، عقلانیت و ادراک) می‌داند. از نظر نگارنده نظریۀ منفعت و همچنین خوانش طبیعت‌گرایانه از معیار واقعی‌گرایی، بستر مناسبی برای شناسایی شخصیت حقوقی حیوانات و طبیعت به‌شمار می‌آیند. مبنای شخصیت حقوقی انسان و حیوانات در نظام حقوقی ایران به مانند دیگر نظام‌های حقوقی معاصر، به استناد مواد قانون مدنی و قوانین محیطی زیستی بر پایۀ نظریۀ سنتی توانایی برخورداری از حقوق و یا تکالیف استوار است که صرفاً انسان را به‌عنوان شخص می‌شناسد و حیوانات را در دستۀ اشیا قرار می‌دهد.

https://jlq.ut.ac.ir/article_107536_1fe6a8e759005c661193f3a1046e44bf.pdf

دانشگاه تهران مطالعات حقوق خصوصی 2588-5618 56 1 2026 04 21 Foundations and Scope of the Obligation to Exploit Industrial Intellectual Property by the Contracting Party مبانی و قلمرو تعهد به بهره‌برداری از مال فکری صنعتی توسط طرف قرارداد 145 168 107539 10.22059/jlq.2026.393735.1007983 FA پژمان محمدی استاد گروه حقوق مالکیت فکری، دانشکده حقوق، دانشگاه تربیت مدرس، تهران، ایران، محمد مهاجری دانش‌آموخته کارشناسی ارشد حقوق مالکیت فکری، دانشکده حقوق، دانشگاه تربیت مدرس، تهران، ایران. Journal Article 2025 04 19 Introduction The Creators of intellectual property seek to distribute their intellectual achievements to society and exploit them to acquire wealth and recognition. To this end, they proceed to conclude exploitation contracts with capital owners. Legal systems that deem the widespread dissemination and proliferation of the results of such intellectual assets in society as beneficial, indeed necessary, have allocated specific monopolies and protections to these individuals. This is intended to encourage both creators and investors to enter into exploitation contracts. Furthermore, these systems have established legal sanctions to prevent the breach of the obligation to exploit. In essence, industrial intellectual property, including inventions, trademarks, and industrial designs, is recognized as an engine of economic and technological development. The effective exploitation of these assets benefits not only the right holder but also serves the public interest. A foundational question is whether the contracting party—be it the inventor, trademark owner, or industrial designer—is obligated to exploit the intellectual property subject to the contract. The obligation to exploit prevents intellectual assets from lying fallow, ensuring that the monopolies granted for such properties do not become sterile and that both society and the right holder can benefit from their potential. The basis for recognizing an exploitation obligation in a contract may stem from the method of determining and paying royalties, statutory provisions, legal principles, or an explicit contractual clause. However, it is crucial to note that the core focus of this research excludes scenarios in which the parties have explicitly or implicitly agreed to the existence or defined the scope of such an obligation. The central debate, rather, concerns the existence or non-existence of this obligation in cases of contractual silence. The primary research question can thus be formulated as follows: In contracts for the transfer or licensing of industrial intellectual property rights, does the party contracting with the intellectual property owner undertake an obligation to exploit, produce, and commercialize products or services derived from or related to that intellectual property? Through a comparative study of Iranian and French law, this research analyzes the foundations, characteristics, and scope of this obligation and seeks to answer this question. Methodology This research employs a descriptive-analytical method, utilizing library and internet resources. Relevant Iranian industrial property laws, particularly the Law on the Protection of Industrial Property enacted in 1403 (2024-2025), as well as French legal sources, have been examined. Furthermore, French case law and the opinions of legal scholars in this field have been analyzed. Conclusion The obligation to exploit intellectual property plays a vital role in the intellectual property system. It prevents the stagnation of industrial intellectual assets, guarantees a return on investment for both the owner and licensee through effective utilization, and maintains a balance between the owner's exclusive rights and the public interest by promoting active use. While Iranian law does not explicitly affirm an obligation to exploit in industrial property contracts, one can infer its implicit presence even in the absence of an explicit stipulation in exploitation agreements structured as permissions (i.e., exclusive or non-exclusive licenses and franchises). This inference is drawn from existing legal provisions, the legislator's emphasis, and the inherent nature and rationale underlying the recognition and transfer of these rights. In outright assignment contracts, the legal nexus between the creator and the intellectual achievement is severed; the creator cannot compel the assignee to exploit. However, the assignee, as the legal successor, is bound to observe statutory duties, which include the effective exploitation of the asset. آفرینندگان دستاوردهای فکری درصدد توزیع دستاورد‌های فکری خود در جامعه و بهره‌برداری از آنها هستند تا از این راه کسب مال و اعتبار کنند و بدین منظور ‌اقدام به انعقاد قراردادهای بهره‌برداری با صاحبان سرمایه می‌کنند. نظام‌های حقوقی که فراگیر شدن و اشاعۀ نتایج این‌گونه اموال در جامعه را مفید بلکه ضروری می‌دانند، انحصارات و حمایت‌هایی را به آفرینندگان این اموال اختصاص داده‌اند تا از این راه هم آفرینندگان دستاورد و هم سرمایه‌گذاران به انعقاد قرارداد بهره‌برداری تشویق شوند. اینکه آیا طرف قرارداد مخترع، صاحب علامت یا طراح صنعتی به بهر‌ه‌برداری از مال موضوع قرارداد ملزم است یا خیر، پرسشی زیربنایی است. شناسایی تعهد بهره‌برداری در قراردادها می‌تواند ناشی از نحوة تعیین و پرداخت مبلغ حق امتیاز، احکام قانون، اصول حقوقی و یا شرط صریح درج‌شده در قرارداد باشد. این تعهد از متروک ماندن اموال فکری جلوگیری می‌کند تا انحصارات داده‌شده به این دست اموال عقیم نماند و جامعه و صاحب حق از منابع آن بهره‌مند شوند. این پژوهش با روش توصیفی-تحلیلی و با استفاده از منابع کتابخانه‌ای و اینترنتی نگاشته شده است. حقوق ایران وجود تعهد به بهره‌برداری را در قراردادهای حوزۀ مالکیت صنعتی به‌صورت صریح بیان نکرده است، ولی می‌توان با توجه به احکام موجود و تأکید قانونگذار و ماهیت و مبانی شناسایی این حقوق و واگذاری آنها، وجود این تعهد را در اکثر قراردادهای بهره‌برداری مفروض دانست.

https://jlq.ut.ac.ir/article_107539_aab6a557493da6ff4b1852da94a5d691.pdf