مفهوم و مبانی قرارداد خودالزام‌گر و جایگاه آن در حقوق قراردادها

نوع مقاله : مقاله پژوهشی

نویسنده

استادیار گروه حقوق خصوصی دانشگاه حضرت معصومه (س)

چکیده

در دیدگاه سنتی، دولت تضمین‌کنندۀ انحصاری اجرای قرارداد قلمداد می‌شود، اما قرارداد خودالزام‌گر مبتنی بر نظم درون‌ساختاری و مکانیسم‌های پیش‌دستانۀ اجرای قرارداد را تضمین می‌کند، بی‌آنکه اجرای قرارداد نیازمند استفاده از نهادهای خارج از قرارداد باشد. چنین قراردادی مبتنی بر «کارکردگرایی حقوقی» و رویکرد روان‌شناسانه نسبت به حقوق قراردادها شکل گرفته است که با تبیین علل فرصت‌طلبی طرفین تلاش می‌کند از طریق افزایش هزینه‌های خروج از قرارداد و نظارت مبتنی بر مبادله، ضمانت اجرای مؤثر تعیین کند. این مقاله تلاشی است به‌منظور رفع ابهام از مفهوم قرارداد خودالزام‌گر، بررسی تئوری‌های توجیه‌کننده و زمینه‌های استفاده از آن در روابط قراردادی. می‌توان گفت گسترش چنین قراردادهایی مبتنی بر تمرکززدایی حقوقی مزایای فراوانی دارد، اما بهره‌مندی از این قالب نیازمند وجود شرایط و ملزوماتی است که فقدان آنها در ایران موجب شده استفاده از قرارداد خودالزام‌گر رواج چندانی نیابد و صرفاًْ به‌عنوان مکمل ضمانت‌اجراهای سنتی حقوق قراردادها مورد توجه قرار گیرد.

کلیدواژه‌ها


عنوان مقاله [English]

CONSIDER THE CONTENT AND BASICS OF SELF-ENFORCING AGREEMENTS IN CONTRACT LAW

نویسنده [English]

  • Mohammad Hossein Vakili Moghadam
Assistant Professor of Private Law, Hazrat-e-Masoumeh University, Iran
چکیده [English]

Traditionally, the state has been regarded as the sole actor guaranteeing contract performance. Self-enforcing agreements are based on private order which assures contractual performance by extra-legal governance and ex-ante mechanisms. This article considers the meaning of self-enforcing agreements and outlines the basics. The reasoning behind self-enforcing agreements is found on legal functionalism and psychological approach of contract law. This viewpoint emphasizes on the opportunism of parties and seeks to assure contracts imposing on cost exit and relational governance. The findings of this study confirm the benefits of non-governmental performance, which improves the legal decentralism. These agreements are not well known in Iran and this topic is still a relatively unstudied area. As a result, it is safe to say the lack of requirements of self-enforcing agreements to constitute them as complementary and not substitute.   

کلیدواژه‌ها [English]

  • Binding
  • Contractual enforcement mechanisms
  • Contractual governance
  • Exchange governance
  • Game theory
  • Management of contract
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