https://jlq.ut.ac.ir/ Law Quarterly en daily 1 Sun, 23 Aug 2026 00:00:00 +0330 Sun, 23 Aug 2026 00:00:00 +0330 https://jlq.ut.ac.ir/article_109073.html The fourth of Mordad marks the fortieth anniversary of the passing of Professor Mahmoud Shahabi Khorasani, one of the luminaries of Iranian letters and thought, and of philosophy, theology (kalām), jurisprudence (fiqh), and legal theory (uṣūl al-fiqh). He was among those eminent scholars whose intellectual careers took shape at the point of convergence between the traditional pedagogy of the Hawza and the new system of modern university education in Iran. Distinguished in jurisprudence and its principles, philosophy and theology, history and literature, and mysticism (irfān), he was an original thinker and a mujtahid who left a substantial scholarly corpus. After years of study in the Hawza of Mashhad and Isfahan, he began his teaching career at the Sepahsalar School in Tehran. He subsequently joined the University of Tehran, teaching first at the Faculty of Theology; following the establishment of the Faculty of Law and Political Science, he held a chair there, where he taught “Principles of Jurisprudence” (uṣūl al-fiqh) and “Maxims of Jurisprudence”( qawā’id-e fiqh ) and attained the rank of distinguished professor of the University of Tehran. His many years at the Faculty of Law, beyond teaching jurisprudence and its principles to successive generations of students of law and theology, contributed significantly to the training of a number of Iran’s leading professors, jurists, and judges. In this respect, Shahabi’s stature cannot be confined to the scope of his scholarly writings; his legacy is a lasting one in education, ethics, and mysticism, and he was also one of the pillars of the Faculty’s institutional character. On the occasion of the fortieth anniversary of this eminent professor’s passing, and in recognition of his standing, this article offers a concise review of the various dimensions of his life (scholarly, ethical, and mystical). It further seeks to reassess his place in the history of legal education in Iran and at the Faculty of Law of the University of Tehran. https://jlq.ut.ac.ir/article_109074.html IntroductionIn contemporary contract law, the rapid expansion of standard-form and adhesion contracts has profoundly challenged the classical doctrines of mutual assent and party autonomy. Under the traditional "opportunity to read" criterion, legal doctrine presumes that pre-contractual access to the text inherently entails commitment to all its clauses, based on the assumption that forgoing examination despite sufficient opportunity constitutes a deliberate choice equivalent to voluntary assumption of the contractual terms. However, behavioral and cognitive realities reveal that this premise fundamentally conflicts with rational decision-making. In standard-form contracting, declining to read boilerplate provisions is not an act of mere negligence, but rather a manifestation of rational non-reading—an optimal behavioral choice grounded in cost-benefit calculus, given that investing cognitive effort and time to scrutinize non-negotiable, lengthy terms yields negligible practical utility. Furthermore, policies promoting plain-language drafting and textual simplification, as emphasized in international instruments like the Draft Common Frame of Reference (DCFR), have largely failed to resolve this crisis, culminating instead in a state of "double ambiguity"; the primary obstacle is not merely esoteric terminology, but rather the consumer's fundamental unfamiliarity with the default legal backdrop that such technical clauses alter or displace. Crucially, the formal opportunity to read often backfires by creating a judicial presumption of awareness, thereby shielding unfair terms from subsequent judicial modification or invalidation. Within the Iranian legal framework, a predominant reliance on ex-post remedies and formalistic verifications of assent (embodied in Article 190 of the Civil Code) leaves the weaker party without effective ex-ante protection. While the statutory right of withdrawal in Article 37 of the Electronic Commerce Act implicitly acknowledges defective awareness at the moment of formation, resolving this systemic imbalance requires moving beyond the formalistic opportunity-to-read paradigm and toward the substantive realization of the "possibility of achieving informed consent.MethodThe research uses a descriptive‑analytical method, reporting and describing relevant data and analyzing the subject in light of the Iranian legal situation. Given the extensive development of doctrines on standard-form contracts and consumer consent in comparative jurisdictions, this study conducts a comparative examination of European consumer law—with an emphasis on the Draft Common Frame of Reference (DCFR) and cooling-off regimes—alongside Anglo-American doctrines, incorporating insights from behavioral law and economics. ConclusionThe findings show that the traditional "opportunity to read" doctrine is an untenable legal fiction that paradoxically legitimizes unilateral terms and disarms the weaker contracting party. A critical evaluation of contemporary alternatives reveals that no single mechanism adequately resolves the dilemma. Ex-post judicial policing through the doctrine of unconscionability suffers from inherent conceptual vagueness, excessive judicial discretion, and an onerous evidentiary burden on consumers, thereby failing to deter ex-ante while undermining commercial predictability. Conversely, ex-ante administrative approval through regulatory reading agents substitutes bureaucratic paternalism for individual autonomy, introduces institutional rigidity, and carries persistent risks of regulatory capture. Moreover, post-contractual rights of withdrawal, while offering a valuable cooling-off period, suspend the finality of transactions, facilitate strategic opportunism, and remain largely ineffective in contracts involving immediate or non-restitutable performances. In Iranian jurisprudence, the statutory right of withdrawal can be reinterpreted as an ex-post intervention mitigating post-formation cognitive bias, yet it cannot single-handedly guarantee cognitive comprehension of complex clauses. Consequently, establishing contractual fairness requires a paradigm shift from formal opportunities to an integrated model focused on the substantive possibility of achieving informed consent. This paradigm entails a coordinated synthesis of mandatory ex-ante interventions—including structured information architecture, salient behavioral disclosures, and a standardized, layered presentation of core terms—with robust ex-post mechanisms, such as tailored withdrawal rights and enhanced judicial authority to invalidate or reform unfair boilerplate clauses. https://jlq.ut.ac.ir/article_109076.html IntroductionThe Construction Partnership Contract (qarārdād-e moshārakat dar sākht) is a contractual arrangement under which the landowner and the developer participate, in accordance with their respective contributions, in the construction project undertaken on the land and in the property arising therefrom. Despite the widespread use of this type of contract in practice, Iranian law has a normative gap, as no specific statutory provisions regulate it, and it has received relatively limited scholarly attention. The relationship between construction partnership contracts and building pre-sale contracts has become particularly significant in practice because the parties, especially the developer, may pre-sell units within the developer’s share to finance the costs of the construction project.The Law on the Pre-Sale of Buildings (enacted in 2010) permits the pre-sale of units belonging to the developer, whom the legislator refers to as the “investor.” Subsequently, Article 15 of the Law on Mandatory Official Registration of Transactions in Immovable Property (enacted in 2024), by amending Article 1 of the Law on the Pre-Sale of Buildings, has expressly brought construction partnership contracts within the scope of building pre-sale contracts and thereby subjected them to the provisions of the latter Law. Under the amended provision, any contract, regardless of its title, under which the owner of land officially enters into a construction partnership with another person, as well as any contract under which a person undertakes to construct and transfer a specified unit, and any transfer of the rights and obligations arising from such contracts, is deemed to constitute a building pre-sale.Before the enactment of the 2024 Registration Law, these two contractual arrangements were distinct: each had its own legal nature and scope, and neither fell within the other's legal framework. Article 15 has, however, transformed this relationship into one of absolute generality and specificity, effectively treating the construction partnership contract as a species or instance of a building pre-sale contract. This legislative approach is open to question in view of the substantive and functional differences between the two arrangements, the common intention of the parties, and the realities of customary and administrative practice. This assimilation may also create significant legal difficulties and ambiguities in applying the provisions of the Law on the Pre-Sale of Buildings to construction partnership contracts.MethodThe present study adopts a descriptive-analytical method with a critical approach. It first examines the legal nature and characteristics of construction partnership contracts independently of the legislative intervention introduced by Article 15, taking into account the parties' intention, governing customs, and practical contracting patterns. Given the flexibility and diversity of construction partnership arrangements, the study focuses on their dominant forms and customary modes of operation. It also draws on the views and experiences of practitioners and professionals concerning the relationship between the Law on the Pre-Sale of Buildings and construction partnership contracts, as well as the legal consequences of subjecting the latter to the former, an area that has received limited attention in previous research.The study first identifies the operational characteristics of both arrangements. It examines their respective demand and supply sides, the decisive role of time in their formation and performance, and the fact that both constitute contractual arrangements or practices rather than necessarily corresponding to a single nominate contract. Regarding the legal nature of a building pre-sale, the study considers the competing views that existed under the general rules of the Civil Code before the enactment of the 2010 Law. These views include characterizing the pre-sale merely as an undertaking to sell, as a translative contract involving co-ownership shares in the land and the gradual transfer of title to the building, or as a combination of a translative act concerning the land and an obligational act concerning construction. Following the enactment of the 2010 Law, however, doctrinal authorities have generally treated building pre-sale as a nominate contract.By contrast, construction partnership contracts lack specific statutory regulation, and the Civil Code's partnership provisions do not adequately govern them. Through comparison with suspended sale, salaf, contracts for the hire of services, juʿāla, partnership, muḍāraba, promissory agreements, istiṣnāʿ, construction contracts, and joint ventures, the study identifies the construction partnership contract as an independent contractual arrangement founded on the principle of freedom of contract under Article 10 of the Civil Code.The two arrangements are then distinguished along seven principal axes: the type of contract, namely participatory as opposed to purely commutative; the identity and legal position of the parties; the nature of consideration and obligations; the timing of the transfer of ownership; the accessory or principal character of the contractual relationship; the scale and extent of their use; and the differing need for legislative protection. These distinctions demonstrate that construction partnership contracts and building pre-sale contracts cannot readily be treated as identical legal institutions merely because both may ultimately concern the construction and transfer of units in a building.The study subsequently examines the rationale for assimilating construction partnership contracts to building pre-sales and considers the practical consequences of such assimilation. These include the mandatory formalization of the contracts and the criminalization of certain informal arrangements, as well as the difficulty of applying provisions specifically linked to installment payments in building pre-sales. Exercising termination or rescission rights under the Law on the Pre-Sale of Buildings may also create significant complications when those rights extend to construction partnership contracts.Finally, the study examines the Implementing Regulation of Note 3 to Article 14 of the Registration Law, particularly its requirements concerning formalization, the assignment of a “single identifier” (shenāseh-ye yektā), and the restriction of subsequent legal dispositions to those based on such identifier. These requirements are assessed in light of the distinctive structure and practical operation of construction partnership contracts.ConclusionsArticle 15 of the Law on Mandatory Official Registration of Transactions in Immovable Property treats construction partnership contracts as building pre-sale contracts and consequently subjects them to the Law on the Pre-Sale of Buildings. Under this approach, the landowner is effectively treated as the pre-purchaser and the developer as the pre-seller. The study finds that this legislative generalization results from insufficient attention to the fundamental differences between the two arrangements, as well as to the common intention of the parties and the realities of customary and practical dealings.Construction partnership contracts are essentially based on partnership and cooperation between the parties and therefore possess a participatory character, whereas building pre-sale contracts are fundamentally commutative. Moreover, the Law on the Pre-Sale of Buildings is essentially protective legislation intended to safeguard the interests of the pre-purchaser as the weaker party. Extending its extensive protective mechanisms to a contractual arrangement in which the parties generally occupy relatively balanced positions and negotiate their respective rights and obligations freely is therefore unnecessary. By imposing additional legal and contractual burdens on developers, such an approach may also dampen investment incentives in the construction sector.Applying rescission rights designed for pre-purchaser-to-construction partnership contracts may create particularly significant legal difficulties. Likewise, several provisions of the Law on the Pre-Sale of Buildings are either inapplicable to construction partnership contracts or unsuitable for their particular structure. For example, the landowner, deemed the pre-purchaser under Article 15 of the Registration Law, generally does not make a monetary payment or installment payment to the developer. Consequently, many provisions designed to secure payment of the pre-purchase price are inapplicable because they lack a subject matter in construction partnership contracts.Ultimately, although the legislator’s objective of regulating construction partnership relationships and strengthening legal certainty is understandable, assimilating these contracts to building pre-sales does not provide an appropriate legal response to their distinctive nature. The appropriate approach is therefore to develop dedicated statutory rules for construction partnership contracts, standardize contractual terms, and design model contracts that faithfully reflect the distinctive features of these arrangements. https://jlq.ut.ac.ir/article_109077.html IntroductionThe fiction is one of the important institutions in French law. Whenever the legislator or judicial practice has sought to deviate from logical criteria in applying legal rules, it has resorted to fiction. French law assumes the function that the institutions of obedient injunction or worūd and ḥukūmat had in Shi'a jurisprudence, and consequently in Iranian law, through legal fictions. In this article, after presenting some preliminary issues, including the theoretical basis of fictions and their comparison with similar institutions in Iranian law, we will address the legal regime governing the emergence, functions, and abolition of legal fictions. Creating legal fictions usually requires manipulating the rules of formal logic. The methods of formal logic often conflict with social and human behavioral requirements. Legal fictions symbolize logic's retreat before social realities. Alongside the intellectual basis for the emergence of legal fictions, the historical foundations of this matter in Western law should not be overlooked. Historically, the static and inflexible nature of Roman law forced judges in this empire to resort to excessive legal analogy and fictions to adapt their decisions to existing realities. In establishing a legal presumption, the legislator or judicial procedure sometimes intervenes in the conditions for realizing the legal rule and sometimes in its effects. Sometimes the legislator assumes conditions that do not exist in reality, and sometimes it imposes illogical consequences on a legal institution. In examining legal institutions similar to legal fictions, we will refer to legal and judicial presumptions, judicial analogy, practical principles, and obedient injunctions in Shiite jurisprudence. Despite their independence, legal fictions are still comparable in nature, principles, and especially effects to jurisprudential institutions such as obedient injunctions in Shiite jurisprudence. In Iranian law, there has been considerable debate about whether the basis for religious rules such as the validity of confession or testimony is rational or religious. Treating the validity of confession or testimony as a religious rule has important effects; most importantly, it makes it impossible to prove the discredit of the provisions of confession or testimony. Therefore, obedient injunctions in Shiite jurisprudence are similar to legal fictions in this respect, just as they are comparable to legal fictions in terms of the narrow interpretation of the injunction resulting from their execution.The emergence of legal fictions requires ignoring reality. The legislator's failure to see reality occurs either through ignoring the logical conditions for applying the rule or by ignoring the logical effects of applying the legal rule in question. When the law finds a solution to a legal rule suitable for a new subject, it ignores the fulfillment of some conditions for applying that rule. These conditions do not actually exist in the new subject, but the law consciously ignores this fact and thereby manipulates the conditions for fulfilling the rule in question. In this epistemological process, the law sometimes assumes the existence of the rule's conditions; sometimes it compares the new subject's conditions in a meta-logical analogy with the conditions of the rule's original subject. On the other hand, the legislator's manipulation of the logical effects of legal rules also leads to the emergence of legal fictions. Manipulating the logical results and effects of implementing a legal rule may involve changing the rule's content or the timing of its effects. Changing the content of legal rules in Iranian law has led to extending mortgage transaction provisions to all types of revocable contracts in Article 34 bis of the amended Registration Law of 1972. In this way, the revocable sale produces the effects of a mortgage contract, despite the parties' intention and the ordinary effects of legal rules. The retroactive effect of legal institutions such as permission in an unauthorized sale also results from the legislator's interference by manipulating the timing of the realization of a legal institution's effects. On this basis, the Theory of Discovery has adopted a narrow interpretation of the effects of the owner's permission in an unauthorized sale.The meta-logical nature of the legal presumption naturally limits the effects of this legal institution. The legal fiction is effective only in relation to its main subject, but its effectiveness is limited in relation to collateral effects. Accordingly, Article 17 of the Civil Code, although it considers animals and objects that the owner has allocated for agricultural purposes as immovable property, establishes this provision only “for the purposes of the jurisdiction of the courts and the confiscation of property.” Therefore, outside the jurisdiction of the courts and the confiscation of property, these properties are considered movable and, for example, the cost of proceedings related to these properties will be calculated similarly to the cost of proceedings of other movable properties.Method This study adopts a descriptive-analytical and qualitative methodology based on documentary and library-based research In this article, through a comparative legal analysis, we examine and analyze the legal foundations underlying the establishment of the “legal fiction” and its legal effects in French and Islamic law.ConclusionsBecause legal fictions emerge from the incompatibility of legal rules with social realities, changes in fundamental legal concepts or exceptions to general legal rules can cause legal fictions to lose their existential basis. One fundamental concept that caused a legal fiction in French law to lose its existential basis was the ruling on the legal incapacity of married women. In implementing this institution, French jurisprudence had to resort to the legal fiction of implicit representation of the wife from husband, in order to recognize the validity of transactions that the wife makes in the interests of the family. However, with the abolition of the legal incapacity of married women by the Act of July 12, 1946, the married woman enjoyed independence in carrying out transactions, and resorting to the legal fiction of implicit representation became meaningless. The introduction of exceptions to general legal rules meant that the French Civil Code reforms of 2016 did not foresee the legal fiction of the retroactive effect of conditional contracts. In fact, French civil law provided for a retroactive effect for a conditional contract to protect persons who entered into a contract with the customer without knowing that their rights were at risk. Without retroactive effect, transactions the customer makes with respect to the sold goods before the execution of the conditional contract will be null and void because, under the principle, a conditional contract before the fulfillment of the condition has no effect on the transfer of ownership. However, in 2016, the French legislator, while not accepting the retroactive effect of conditional contracts, recognized as valid the contracts that the customer makes for the management and protection of the sold goods (Article 1304-7 of the French Civil Code, amended in 2016). In this way, the rule invalidating unauthorized transactions was met with an exception in these cases, and the legal assumption of the retroactive effect of conditional contracts lost its basis. https://jlq.ut.ac.ir/article_109078.html IntroductionThe demand for compensation has always been one of humanity's primary needs. To meet this need, various traditions have long governed this area, and numerous theories have shaped the legal system's rules.In this progression, although an ideal compensation system should enable all injured parties to obtain fair recompense regardless of the search for the cause of the harm, this expectation was often unmet in the past or inadequately met under the influence of familial solidarity. Consequently, in step with social transformations, the law has had to develop different mechanisms to meet this growing demand for security. Following the identification of certain causes for liability in early civilizations and the legal obligation to compensate for damages, the "Principle of Responsibility" made it possible to provide for losses through a general rule based on various foundations such as fault, risk, etc., and finally, in the continuation of this path, special or automatic systems of compensation for damages were created. The question is, from a perspective of justice, what underlying thought justifies this evolution in law and the demand for compensation?Some scholars, discussing the evolution of the compensation system, indicate that in this developmental process, the debt of responsibility transforms into the right to compensation. In this Analysis, when the corrective justice of responsibility cannot compensate for the adverse consequences of unfortunate events, it is replaced by the distributive justice of solidarity. As this analysis shows, the measure of justice that assesses damage can be either corrective or distributive, and this division reflects the difference that justifies the logic of compensation institutions and explains the consequences of choosing each one.The concepts of corrective and distributive justice have been studied since ancient civilizations. The influence of these concepts on civil liability has also been frequently discussed and re-examined. Regardless of the philosophical debates, the role of distributive and corrective justice in compensation raises considerations and leads to legal consequences that warrant examination. Rather than repeatedly emphasizing definitions and theories, this article examines the role of corrective justice in compensation by considering legal realities, the relationships between the parties in a harmful event, and the motivations of third parties and groups responsible for providing compensation. It then argues that distributive justice is impossible in civil liability and examines the effects of separating distributive and corrective justice in compensation.MethodThis study uses a documentary and library research method to review conventional beliefs about ​​justice in compensation through a different legal analysis of theoretical data.ConclusionFacilities and costs are distributed among citizens according to the merits defined by each society. This division, whether correct or incorrect, has nothing to do with civil liability. Civil liability intervenes when an incident occurs and disrupts the predefined balance. Therefore, the question is whether, in this situation, civil responsibility can establish a new allocation of rights, or merely provide the possibility of ensuring justice in the redistribution of social opportunities and possibilities.Compensation, in any form, whether based on corrective or distributive principles, is a means for achieving justice. Despite the development of various methods and principles presented as theories of compensation, the traditional framework of compensation and civil liability remains limited to the corrective idea. In principle, the various foundations of civil liability all agree that the burden of the loss must be returned to its agent. This agent, who is ultimately human, is responsible for the harmful act attributed to him, and compensation for the damages will be instead of her agency in the realization of the loss.Furthermore, despite growing social demand for compensation, the closed framework of corrective justice cannot cover all adverse consequences. Therefore, alongside the expansion of civil liability, distributive justice (through social solidarity) supports corrective justice and even replaces it in some of the traditional duties of civil liability. In reality, the idea of distributive justice does not expand civil liability; rather, it directs a portion of the duty to compensate outside this institution. Moreover, distributive justice allows an approach in which coverage for new risks is provided, or compensation is provided that is not compensatory in nature.Although developing compensation rights through the distributive idea is desirable, it should not go too far: on the one hand, civil liability cannot be replaced or erased, and conversely, the idea of compensatory justice is deeply rooted in it. On the other hand, accepting distributive justice must take various exigencies into account. Therefore, public institutions must respect budgetary requirements and financial capacity in this regard. Moreover, applying distributive justice and compensation outside the conventional liability system should not create a sense of discrimination or lead to unjustifiable disparity among victims of similar incidents. Attention to these issues and adopting the necessary measures and arrangements means that distributive justice plays a secondary role in compensation law and can only complement civil liability. https://jlq.ut.ac.ir/article_109079.html Introduction Undoubtedly, this statement by Holmes, the American pioneer of the realist school, who believed that legal knowledge comes from experience rather than logic, should be taken to heart. This concept emphasizes the significant role of on-the-ground circumstances in shaping the legal challenges users face within the judicial system. This process doubles the importance and status of judicial procedure in any legal system. Because, contrary to legal doctrine or legal etiquette, a solution must be proposed to overcome it so the court's decision can be considered a major step toward ending the existing conflict.One of these challenges, which of course has been exacerbated by the economic conditions of the last decade, concerns how to evaluate claims that, beyond being common, can evolve over time. A well-established example is the daily rate compensation claim, as outlined in Unanimous Decision No. 811. In this case and old examples such as the payment of the days of possession or the right to acquire or trade or profession of the tenant, the subject of the Landlord-Tenant Relations Law of 1977, or the demand for a fair price for land that has been seized in the implementation of the Law on the Manner of Purchase and Acquisition of Lands, enacted in 1979, and the Additional Note thereto, enacted in 2009, The plaintiff, and occasionally the defendant, seek to determine the value corresponding to the day or the time of enforcement of the judgment so that, on this basis, they can confidently manage their financial affairs through shocks such as unchecked inflation. However, the customary and selected method in current judicial practice does not indicate a favorable response to this logical tendency and to the rights of the litigants mentioned above. On this basis, after recognizing the plaintiff's and defendant's right to payment, the court begins the evaluation process, which is always accompanied by an expert opinion and includes its final result in the operative part of the judgment. This approach, whose efficacy has admittedly been considerably diminished today, has at least two consequences.First, the final price stated by the court in its decision and the amount the plaintiff or defendant is instructed to pay invariably diverge significantly from prevailing economic inflation. This will never satisfy the convict and will force him to take another step to compensate for this deficiency, relying on legal bases such as the Note to Article 19 of the 2002 Law on Official Experts of the Judiciary, to undertake yet another initiative to remedy this deficiency. Such conduct will, needless to say, increase the frequency of litigation. Second, the prolongation of judicial proceedings, or what is commonly known as “undue delay in proceedings,” will be among the direct consequences of the proposed method. This is because repeated expert examinations in the course of judicial proceedings will prolong the proceedings. This will prolong the litigation process through successive expert opinions.Given the widespread recognition of the inefficiency inherent in traditional methodologies, it is imperative to take corrective measures and develop innovative strategies to avert their detrimental effects. The pertinent inquiry then arises: what actions should be pursued? The approach proposed in this research, significantly influenced by the author's experience as a judge and daily case analyst, introduces the concept of "mixed or hybrid judgments." This term, as suggested by its name, derives from the fusion of “judgment" and "order.” Consequently, a court’s decision possesses a dual nature; it functions as a judgment by delineating rights and providing a definitive stance on the validity of claims and proceedings, and simultaneously as an “order” since it entrusts the assessment of the claimant’s or defendant’s entitlement to an expert—an assessment to be overseen during the execution phase, in accordance with the provisions of Article 75 of the Civil Judgments Enforcement Law.Method This research used a descriptive-analytical method to analyze the subject. However, unlike in other studies, the required data were mainly derived from court decisions and judicial procedures, and library resources were used mainly to strengthen the scientific support for the study's proposal.Conclusions“Mixed judgment" is an emerging concept identified within litigation law, and its application aligns with the core principles of civil procedural law. This institution is a logical response aligned with the common understanding of justice, where users expect the court's decision—especially in cases subject to significant changes due to economic inflation—to efficiently prevent the need to reopen cases that could result in detrimental effects such as increased economic costs and extended durations. Such an outcome is attainable through the unified criteria outlined in Article 46 of the Civil Judgment Enforcement Act and the mechanism established in Article 75 of the same law. https://jlq.ut.ac.ir/article_109080.html IntroductionDiscussions of interpretation primarily concern contracts, whether drafted as ordinary documents or formal deeds. In legal scholarship, interpretation typically focuses on contracts and their performance; the aim is to uncover the parties' true intent using established rules. Similarly, statutory interpretation seeks to ascertain the legislator's intent. Thus, the objective in interpreting contracts is first to discover the parties' intent, or—failing that—to interpret the contract according to rules accepted by custom and the practices of reasonable people; likewise, the goal of statutory interpretation is to uncover the legislator's intent or, if that is not possible, to interpret the law based on reason and custom. Iranian law contains no explicit provision on interpreting court judgments. It appears to be assumed that judgments require no interpretation, as the judge—possessing comprehensive knowledge of the law and the case file—would not issue a ruling containing ambiguities or contradictions. In reality, however, court judgments can be ambiguous, vague, or contain contradictory and irreconcilable sections; consequently, interpreting a judgment sometimes becomes unavoidable. When a judgment inevitably requires interpretation, how should it be construed in light of procedural rules and principles? The Iranian Code of Civil Procedure is silent on this matter and offers no direct answer; however, the law does authorize the court to rectify a judgment in cases involving clerical errors, slips of the pen, the omission or addition of words, or calculation errors. (Article 309 of the Civil Procedure Code) Given the possibility of ambiguity, vagueness, or contradiction within various parts of a judgment (Clause 3, Article 426 of the Civil Procedure Code), and considering the shared rationale between the correction and the interpretation of a judgment, it would have been preferable for the Civil Procedure Code to explicitly provide for the interpretation of judgments and the associated procedure. Although the Law on the Enforcement of Civil Judgments contains provisions (Articles 26, 27, and 29) regarding disputes over the content of a judgment, as well as the resolution of conflicts arising from its enforcement, it remains silent on the procedure for resolving ambiguity and vagueness, the nature of the court's decision in this regard, and the method of challenging such a decision. The Criminal Procedure Code (Article 497) rightly designates the court that issued the final judgment as the authority for resolving ambiguity and vagueness, and the enforcement judge as the authority for resolving enforcement-related issues; however, it does not specify the procedural rules for resolving ambiguity and vagueness or the nature of the court's decision.MethodologyThis article examines the concept of a judgment, the need to interpret court judgments, and the interpretation of settlement agreements (recorded by the court), arbitral awards, and foreign court judgments (where Iranian courts consider recognition or enforcement). Since the author holds the view that the interpretation of a court judgment must follow civil procedure rules—and that the resulting court decision constitutes an "interpretative judgment"—this article also discusses the procedure and time limits for requesting an interpretation, the requirements for such a request, the competent court, the scope of interpretation, and the methods for challenging these decisions. Given that the Iranian Code of Civil Procedure is silent regarding the procedure for requesting the interpretation of a judgment and the nature of the court's decision thereon, the interpretation of judgments—as well as the associated procedures and the nature of the court's ruling—has been examined within the context of French law to serve as a model for researchers and legislators.ConclusionsIranian Code of Civil Procedure is silent regarding the interpretation of judicial rulings, the governing procedure, the nature of the court's decision on interpretation, and the applicable rules. This silence has led legal scholars and judicial practice to frequently equate interpreting a ruling with disputes arising from the enforcement of judgments. However, ambiguity or lack of clarity in a ruling does not always result in enforcement disputes; for instance, a court may be asked to interpret final orders or declaratory judgments (pursuant to Article 4, Clause 2 of the Law on Enforcement of Civil Judgments), or a ruling might be submitted as evidence in a separate lawsuit, compelling the court hearing that case to interpret the ruling. Similar considerations apply to interpreting foreign court judgments sought to be enforced in Iran, domestic and foreign arbitral awards, and settlement agreements recorded by the court. Therefore, it is proposed that the Code of Civil Procedure be amended to clearly define the obligations and procedures for interpreting rulings, mirroring the approach taken in the Code of Criminal Procedure. To guide legislators, legal scholars, judges, and attorneys, this article also examines the French Code of Civil Procedure and the rules governing the interpretation of rulings under French law, offering a resource should the legislature decide to amend the law.