نوع مقاله : مقاله پژوهشی
نویسندگان
1 دانشجوی دکتری حقوق خصوصی دانشگاه تهران (پردیس بین‌المللی کیش)، ایران
2 استادیار گروه حقوق خصوصی و اسلامی دانشکدة حقوق و علوم سیاسی دانشگاه تهران، تهران، ایران
3 دانشیار گروه حقوق خصوصی و اسلامی دانشکدة حقوق و علوم سیاسی دانشگاه تهران، تهران، ایران
چکیده
کلیدواژه‌ها
عنوان مقاله [English]
نویسندگان [English]
Abstract
The existence of a coherent registration system is the premise of ensuring the security of real estate transactions and maintaining the stability and order in their legal status. Whether a secondary real estate registration system, registering transactions involving registered estates, is necessary and how its implementation must be guaranteed is one of the questions determining the optimal economic performance of real estate transactions and ensuring their security, because property rights being correctly created, through primary registration, and stabilized, through secondary registration, will lead to the establishment of economic order, which necessitates an economic analysis of secondary registration. From the perspective of economic analysis of rights based on the game theory, the parties to the real estate transactions are concerned, in order to adopt a strategic and wise decisions, with how registration will affect them in making or proving their real estate transaction. The question, accordingly, is which legal sanctions for non-registration of real estate transactions the game theory prescribes as leading
the parties to make their transactions registered. The present study predicts the legal behaviors of the actors in the real estate transactions, and provides an economic analysis of the sanctions of the transaction registration under Article 62 of the Permanent Provisions of Development Programs Act. The question is how game theory justifies the necessity of registering real estate transactions. From an economic point of view, the question also arises as to whether the mentioned Article can serve the expected economic functions of a secondary real estate registration rule leading the economic actors to registered transactions. This research is theoretical and applied using library method for data collection and descriptive-analytical method for data analysis. It will conclude that from the perspective of the bargaining strategy, there is a relationship, in the ‘game’ between the parties to real estate transactions, between the need to register those transactions and the guarantees of its implementation. The effect of registration in the making stage will be to shift the game with the bargaining strategy from the channel of registration/non-registration of the transactions to the channel of real estate exchange that enjoys the allocative efficiency defined by Coase. The second type of game, in other words, meets the economic goals of the registration system and is more efficient. As for solving the game, based on the amount in which the Nash equilibrium is obtained, the latter part of Article 62 of the Permanent Provisions of Development Programs Act, disregarding the registration law system, leads the parties to enter into transactions using unregistered deeds. Therefore, this Article, which considers real estate transactions carried out with unregistered deeds to be also valid, needs, from an economic point of view, to be amended, because the acceptance of unregistered deeds in real estate transactions creates a non-cooperative game with a negative or a zero sum. And, according to the game theory, it is only with a secondary registration system, which gives effect to registration in the making stage of real estate transactions that a cooperative game with a positive sum is created and the bargains prescribed by the economic theory of ownership and the Coase’s allocative efficiency are achieved. Finally, in order to achieve the economic efficiency in the Iranian real estate market, higher credibility must be granted to registered documents in transactions. This requires a decisive sanction against real estate transactions carried out by unregistered deeds and making the registration a necessary element of their validity, so that parties have no other choice but to conclude those transactions in a formal manner. Therefore, in order to create secure ownership, investment and economic development, , it is necessary to amend, following the example of the legal system of developed countries, regulations that, contrary to the purposes of the registration law, consider the unregistered deeds of real estate transactions as valid and to provide rules that motivate citizens to behave efficiently. This rules should
drive the bargaining in real estate transactions to what economic theory of ownership prescribes, which is attainable only through registered transactions, where registration is a required element of a valid transaction.
کلیدواژه‌ها [English]
منابع
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