THE LINK BETWEEN ECONOMICS AND LAW TO PROVIDE A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK FOR SUPPLYING VOLUNTARY PUBLIC GOODS

Document Type : Research Paper

Authors

1 PhD in Economics, Department of Economics, Ferdowsi University, Mashhad, Iran

2 Assistant Professor of Economics, Department of Economics, Ferdowsi University, Mashhad, Iran

3 Assistant Professor of Economics, Law Department, Farabi Campus, University of Tehran, Iran

4 Associate Professor of Economics, Department of Economics, Ferdowsi University, Mashhad, Iran

Abstract

Reforming official institutions enacting economic law and regulations and guaranteeing their implementation is an integral part of any community. These reforms need to form a collective action among its stakeholders. Although the formation of this collective action among actors with conflicting motives may increase the chances of success for such reforms, economic considerations are faced with significant barriers such as transaction costs. The theory of collective action for voluntary public procurement and transaction cost theory challenged the presumption of the omnipotent and benevolent government; this explained the evolution of decision-making processes within the public sector. In this paper, we attempt to provide a conceptual framework for examining the transaction costs associated with the collective action of political, administrative, and economic actors to guarantee the implementation of law as voluntary public goods. Such action requires the pursuit of information, bargaining and negotiation activities, and ensuring that political, economic, and administrative actors perform the transactions. The results of the conceptual framework, developed based on a combination of collective action and transaction cost theories in this paper show that 18 components influence the costs of collective action for institutional reform. The application of this framework for analyzing the enforcement of business environment facilitation law, in particular the Law on Continuous Improvement of the Business Environment approved in Iran in 2011, shows that despites the lack of legal enforcement guarantees and external supervision deficiencies, there are several components that can cost the collective action required to enforce these law.  

Keywords

References

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Law Quarterly
Volume 49, Issue 4
January 2020
Pages 581-597

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