Document Type : Research Paper
Author
Associate Professor, Department of Private and Islamic Law, Faculty of Law and Political Science, University of Tehran, Tehran, Iran.
Abstract
This article employs a library-based research method that is both critical and analytical-comparative. This approach entails the utilization of resources available in libraries, encompassing both paper and electronic materials. The methodology employed in the study and review was entirely critical. No comment has been included in this article unless it has been subjected to a thorough review and critique. In addition, the contents of this article, including topics and questions, have been subjected to analytical scrutiny with a view to comparative law. Comparative studies have been carried out concerning French law to focus on the analysis and evaluation. The law of French civil procedure and the court precedence of this country have been considered in the comparative study. Along with this study, court precedence has also been examined.
Article 51 (4) of the Civil Procedure Law stipulates that the petitioner must set forth "the obligations and reasons according to which the petitioner considers himself entitled to a claim" to ensure that the intent is clear. This request requires the petitioner to specify the grounds on which they believe their claim to be justified. Although the concept of "reasons" ("le moyen" in French terminology) is discussed in terms of several thematic, prescriptive, and affirmative categories, from an objective standpoint, the reasons can be anything from the perspective of the claimant. They may be rooted in the law of contracts, outside of it, or even in the law. For this reason, an answer within the legal system is sufficient.
This article focuses on whether the plaintiff can rely on more than one aspect in his lawsuit or whether the defendant can raise some aspects and defer others for subsequent consideration rather than presenting all aspects as the basis of his defense. To illustrate, should the petitioner petition the court for a divorce judgment and allege instances of bad behavior, non-payment of alimony, addiction, and neglect? Is it permissible for a divorce seeker to consolidate multiple analogous grounds for dissolution of the marriage into a single category, thereby indicating that she is in a predicament? In a lawsuit to terminate a contract, may the claimant request the termination in general and state his entitlement defect in goods or fraud? In all of these examples, can the judge select one of these aspects and refrain from commenting on the others or issue a judgment of disqualification and rejection? What is the effect of this type of judging? If a person has not raised the claim of termination of the contract due to fraud and other similar grounds in the lawsuit that require the preparation of an official document, can they raise such a claim in a subsequent lawsuit? How would the defendant respond to such a claim?
Two categories of solutions have been proposed to address these questions. One proposed solution is the concentration or consolidation of the aspects in question, which would require the petitioner and the defendant to present all aspects in a proceeding. If they fail to do so, it is assumed that they have claimed or defended all aspects. The other solution, which is the result of the first, is the prohibition of restating these aspects. Subsequently, a new lawsuit is initiated, which includes the res judicata.
The article's primary contribution is delineating a clear distinction between the underlying causes of a dispute and the factors that precipitate and perpetuate it. This distinction is crucial for understanding the complexities of dispute resolution. Accepting that the cause is not one of the fundamental principles of res judicata is impossible. Instead, the subject of the dispute and its entitlements, along with the parties' unity, represent the fundamental principles underpinning the validity of res judicata.
Furthermore, assuming that the general rule is to present all sides simultaneously in every trial is untenable. It is presumed that this has been done, and the res judicata prevents filing a lawsuit or defense against any other party in litigation.
Another noteworthy development is acknowledging the distinction between civil and family procedural norms in this context. Nevertheless, family law and its associated procedures exhibit a distinctive aspect pertaining to the demand for divorce. In this context, divorce is initiated through a formal request, which legal considerations may prompt, the circumstances of the parties involved, or a judge's decision in a complex case involving a woman. One reason, and several reasons, falls into several categories. The Constitution and the symbolic nature of hardships and difficulties make it reasonable to conclude that the judge of the family court may consider the possibility of divorce due to hardships and difficult situations. Furthermore, changes in these reasons should be accepted, even if this is done at the appeal stage. The criterion is that these actions and changes are compatible with the purpose and intent of the request, even though they result in a shift in the legal basis of the lawsuit.
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