Introduction
The fiction is one of the important institutions in French law. Whenever the legislator or judicial practice has sought to deviate from logical criteria in applying legal rules, it has resorted to fiction. French law assumes the function that the institutions of obedient injunction or worūd and ḥukūmat had in Shi'a jurisprudence, and consequently in Iranian law, through legal fictions. In this article, after presenting some preliminary issues, including the theoretical basis of fictions and their comparison with similar institutions in Iranian law, we will address the legal regime governing the emergence, functions, and abolition of legal fictions. Creating legal fictions usually requires manipulating the rules of formal logic. The methods of formal logic often conflict with social and human behavioral requirements. Legal fictions symbolize logic's retreat before social realities. Alongside the intellectual basis for the emergence of legal fictions, the historical foundations of this matter in Western law should not be overlooked. Historically, the static and inflexible nature of Roman law forced judges in this empire to resort to excessive legal analogy and fictions to adapt their decisions to existing realities. In establishing a legal presumption, the legislator or judicial procedure sometimes intervenes in the conditions for realizing the legal rule and sometimes in its effects. Sometimes the legislator assumes conditions that do not exist in reality, and sometimes it imposes illogical consequences on a legal institution. In examining legal institutions similar to legal fictions, we will refer to legal and judicial presumptions, judicial analogy, practical principles, and obedient injunctions in Shiite jurisprudence. Despite their independence, legal fictions are still comparable in nature, principles, and especially effects to jurisprudential institutions such as obedient injunctions in Shiite jurisprudence. In Iranian law, there has been considerable debate about whether the basis for religious rules such as the validity of confession or testimony is rational or religious. Treating the validity of confession or testimony as a religious rule has important effects; most importantly, it makes it impossible to prove the discredit of the provisions of confession or testimony. Therefore, obedient injunctions in Shiite jurisprudence are similar to legal fictions in this respect, just as they are comparable to legal fictions in terms of the narrow interpretation of the injunction resulting from their execution.
The emergence of legal fictions requires ignoring reality. The legislator's failure to see reality occurs either through ignoring the logical conditions for applying the rule or by ignoring the logical effects of applying the legal rule in question. When the law finds a solution to a legal rule suitable for a new subject, it ignores the fulfillment of some conditions for applying that rule. These conditions do not actually exist in the new subject, but the law consciously ignores this fact and thereby manipulates the conditions for fulfilling the rule in question. In this epistemological process, the law sometimes assumes the existence of the rule's conditions; sometimes it compares the new subject's conditions in a meta-logical analogy with the conditions of the rule's original subject. On the other hand, the legislator's manipulation of the logical effects of legal rules also leads to the emergence of legal fictions. Manipulating the logical results and effects of implementing a legal rule may involve changing the rule's content or the timing of its effects. Changing the content of legal rules in Iranian law has led to extending mortgage transaction provisions to all types of revocable contracts in Article 34 bis of the amended Registration Law of 1972. In this way, the revocable sale produces the effects of a mortgage contract, despite the parties' intention and the ordinary effects of legal rules. The retroactive effect of legal institutions such as permission in an unauthorized sale also results from the legislator's interference by manipulating the timing of the realization of a legal institution's effects. On this basis, the Theory of Discovery has adopted a narrow interpretation of the effects of the owner's permission in an unauthorized sale.
The meta-logical nature of the legal presumption naturally limits the effects of this legal institution. The legal fiction is effective only in relation to its main subject, but its effectiveness is limited in relation to collateral effects. Accordingly, Article 17 of the Civil Code, although it considers animals and objects that the owner has allocated for agricultural purposes as immovable property, establishes this provision only “for the purposes of the jurisdiction of the courts and the confiscation of property.” Therefore, outside the jurisdiction of the courts and the confiscation of property, these properties are considered movable and, for example, the cost of proceedings related to these properties will be calculated similarly to the cost of proceedings of other movable properties.




Method
This study adopts a descriptive-analytical and qualitative methodology based on documentary and library-based research In this article, through a comparative legal analysis, we examine and analyze the legal foundations underlying the establishment of the “legal fiction” and its legal effects in French and Islamic law.

Conclusions
Because legal fictions emerge from the incompatibility of legal rules with social realities, changes in fundamental legal concepts or exceptions to general legal rules can cause legal fictions to lose their existential basis. One fundamental concept that caused a legal fiction in French law to lose its existential basis was the ruling on the legal incapacity of married women. In implementing this institution, French jurisprudence had to resort to the legal fiction of implicit representation of the wife from husband, in order to recognize the validity of transactions that the wife makes in the interests of the family. However, with the abolition of the legal incapacity of married women by the Act of July 12, 1946, the married woman enjoyed independence in carrying out transactions, and resorting to the legal fiction of implicit representation became meaningless. The introduction of exceptions to general legal rules meant that the French Civil Code reforms of 2016 did not foresee the legal fiction of the retroactive effect of conditional contracts. In fact, French civil law provided for a retroactive effect for a conditional contract to protect persons who entered into a contract with the customer without knowing that their rights were at risk. Without retroactive effect, transactions the customer makes with respect to the sold goods before the execution of the conditional contract will be null and void because, under the principle, a conditional contract before the fulfillment of the condition has no effect on the transfer of ownership. However, in 2016, the French legislator, while not accepting the retroactive effect of conditional contracts, recognized as valid the contracts that the customer makes for the management and protection of the sold goods (Article 1304-7 of the French Civil Code, amended in 2016). In this way, the rule invalidating unauthorized transactions was met with an exception in these cases, and the legal assumption of the retroactive effect of conditional contracts lost its basis.