سَرو و ماه (فَرَّهْ همچون کشور)

Introduction
If the central theme of politics is “power,” then the foundational essence of law is nothing but “authority.” Yet the question remains: From where does legal authority derive? Ancient Iranians spoke of three distinct forms of authority (farah), and this article seeks to highlight these three sources not only to introduce them to world’s legal systems but also to revive them within Iran’s own legal framework. Iranians historically attributed legal authority to three principal sources. In other words, if authority is understood as the persuasive influence of one individual over another, resulting in obedience, then Iranians have consistently obeyed, beyond their personal desires, the will of three other entities: first, Ahura Mazda, the deity of goodness in Zoroastrianism; second, the charismatic persona of the Iranian monarch; and third, the Country of Iran. Among these, the third (country-based authority) is uniquely Iranian in its legal conception, though it has been deliberately neglected in recent times.
What is particularly distinctive is that Iran has always been perceived by its people as the “motherland,” a maternal figure capable of issuing commands and prohibitions. In other legal systems, authority is typically attributed either to religion or to the state—corresponding to the first two Iranian sources. The former is termed religious law, and the latter secular law. Religious systems, whether individual or oligarchic, tend to be absolutist but secular systems, while also capable of absolutism, today claim their most legitimate form through democracy. However, in Iran, the fusion of country-based authority and King’s charisma produced a third form of governance: monarchy—a legal authority inseparable from both religion and country. Historically, all governments have been categorized into three types: monarchy, oligarchy, and democracy, because either a virtuous individual becomes king for the public good and national preservation (monarchy), or one is elected from among many (democracy), or power rests with a select group (oligarchy).
Modern intellectuals often conflate monarchy with tyranny and condemn it solely for not being democratic. Yet they fail to answer a fundamental question: Why must monarchy prove itself to be a form of democracy, when democracy is its rival, not its destination? Furthermore, a prevalent fallacy in contemporary legal thought is the equation of constitutionalism with democracy and republicanism. In truth, constitutionalism merely demands the recognition of fundamental human rights, which are not necessarily realized under republican or democratic regimes. So, while a monarchy may be constitutional, a republic may be anti-constitutional. Constitutionalism is not synonymous with republicanism; the ideal of constitutionalism is freedom (freedom from absolutism) while democracy’s ideal is equality (equal participation in governance). Democracy, by nature, embraces plurality, and a society is democratic if it acknowledges the multiplicity of rulers even if it lacks constitutionalism. Likewise, some nations possess constitutions without embodying constitutionalism, and how can a constitution be deemed constitutional if it explicitly grants absolute power to a specific office? Thus, a legal system that is constitutional cannot be absolutist, and vice versa. A constitution devoid of constitutionalism may still embrace democracy through elections and referenda—highlighting the fundamental distinction between constitutionalism and democracy.
Historically, democracy has encompassed two distinct meanings: the democracy of beginnings and the democracy of ends. The former evokes elections and referenda, standing in opposition to monarchy. Yet one may ascend to power through democratic procedures and subsequently refuse to relinquish it—thereby contradicting the democracy of ends. The latter is realized only when a ruler peacefully withdraws from power upon the people's rejection. Such a ruler is democratic, even if not initially elected under the democracy of beginnings. Accordingly, if democracy possesses any normative value, it resides in its end-form, not in its beginning-form. In this sense, monarchy may embody the democracy of ends, despite being the rival of its beginning-based counterpart.
Purpose
This article proposes a theorem: Legal Authority = Knowing (Reason) + Desire (Will). Undoubtedly, the union of reason and will—two often conflicting forces—may manifest differently across different legal systems. For instance, legal authority in the United States, as inferred from Alexis de Tocqueville, is deeply tied to the Supreme Court, which enjoys public admiration and respect. This reverence elevates the Court’s status and distinguishes American law from other legal systems. In Iran, legal authority has profoundly been tied to the concept of country and monarchy (molk) as a historical and geographical phenomenon. Yet the country is not synonymous with the state, and while the theory of state focuses on governance and sovereignty, the theory of country prioritizes prosperity and flourishing. According to the theory of “Authority as Country,” only the country’s flourishing matters for the authority of law; the form of government must be chosen according to its historical function to reach prosperity.
Method
Although the data for this study were primarily collected through library research, it has been analyzed using a descriptive-analytical as well as prescriptive-normative method with a comparative approach.
 Conclusion
Iran’s historical memory is filled with monarchs, most of whom devoted themselves to the country’s prosperity, and only a few of whom played a role in its ruin. Yet, Iranians now more than ever revere the legal authority of the law which is instituted for the flourishing of their country, and they resist any law they perceive as contributing to its ruin, thereby diminishing its authority. Thus, contrary to Joseph Raz’s view, law possesses no essential authority. The only essence of law is its attachment to a specific country, and it is the country that bestows authority upon law.
Legal scholars may pursue justice or liberty, but neither justice gives law its meaning nor liberty. Law’s sole purpose is the country’s prosperity because a prosperous country cannot lack justice or liberty, but a just, free, and democratic country may still be impoverished. Therefore, in a prosperous country, some inequalities and limitations may be necessary, just, and aligned with the principles of freedom. Equality and liberty without prosperity are two grand deceptions in legal thought and their value lies only in serving the country’s development. Hence, if justice and liberty exist without prosperity, one must seriously question their authenticity. Iranian law must now reclaim patriotism and the development of country as its ideal. Law has one true ideal: the country; all else—religion, republicanism, democracy, justice, and liberty—are secondary and only gain legal authority if they serve Iran.