نوع مقاله : مقاله پژوهشی
نویسنده
دانشیار، گروه حقوق، دانشکدۀ علوم اداری و اقتصاد، دانشگاه اصفهان، اصفهان، ایران.
چکیده
کلیدواژهها
عنوان مقاله [English]
نویسنده [English]
The scientific formulation of positive law is the basis of François Geny's thought. However, Geny is well aware that if the term "scientific" means extreme scientism of the late nineteenth century, it will result in a positive law that lacks a metaphysical element. However, Geny knows that man is not just matter; it is also the Espirit. Geny refers to a human being who is social, rational, and free, the human being who worries about where he came from, why he came, and where he is going, i.e., the same man that Maulana Jalaluddin Rumi also speaks of his inner voice. However, Geny does not want to fall into the trap of liberal metaphysics of modern natural law and conclude positive law based on the ideology of individualism and the liberal positive law of the family.
Thus, like the philosophers of law in the first half of the twentieth century, he seeks to pursue the interaction of metaphysics and reality as serious concerns. The natural, historical, intellectual, and ideal foundations of François Geny’s thought, which are inextricably linked, are the framework of the same interaction and result in the scientific formulation of positive Law. Real foundations are a set of facts that take precedence over the human mind and human will: physical nature, moral nature, human psychological construction, religious feelings, social and geographical environment situation, the economic situation, and the political or social forces in society The historical foundation does not mean merely some of the socio-historical foundations that potentially and indirectly influence the formation of the law of the present generation. Rather, it refers to norms that, in addition to being the product of the passage of time, manifest themselves as existing law and are responsible for guiding human behavior. The ideal foundation is based on experimental intuition which senses the heartbeat of a social organism and is aware of the mystery of the rules that guide the organism to its areas. Such intuition is related to pragmatism and, of course, should not be confused with Bergson's intuition, which is based on the opposition of intuition and action, and it is the intuition of reason which connects intuition to metaphysics rather than to reality.
Although the rational foundation is more important among these foundations, it does not mean that metaphysics takes precedence over reality; since this reason, on the one hand, is the sole discoverer of the principles derived from the nature of superior objects, and is not intended to replace such nature of objects, which is the basis of the validity of the norm. On the other hand, this intellect is influenced by natural and historical foundations. The empirical nature of intuition also does not negate its guiding role. This intuition is complementary to reason. However, Geny does not place this foundation at the top of its foundations so that experimental intuition does not pave the way for the passage of the nature of superior objects and spiritual intuition; it is an intuition that interacts with the nature of objects, and for Geny to be sure of this interaction, it attributes an experimental description to this intuition and considers it a complete and, of course, evolutionary experience.
Geny’s positive law of the family is based on these four foundations; the point is, however, that intuition of Geny may also result in the socialization of family law if it results in the principle of monogamy and leads to the relative liberation of man from position. In this way, one can critique Geny’s idea, arguing that the end of this evolution is uncertain and does not follow a definite linear path. It should not be forgotten, however, that spiritual intuition prevents this socialization from leading to full institutionalism; both the natural foundation and the historical foundation prevent this spiritual intuition from leading to liberalism and the transition from institution to private contract in the family law system. In any case, the foundations of Geny’s thought are inconsistent with his legalism, which is the result of state positivism.
Empirical intuition is also the basis of the ideal foundation, and such a framework neither sees the transition from institution to contract as its ideal in family law, nor does it conclude marriage that ignores the natural proposition of gender difference; the principle does not challenge the strength and continuity of the family, and at the same time, does not prevent the family system from evolving.
کلیدواژهها [English]
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