نوع مقاله : مقاله پژوهشی
نویسندگان
1 دانشیار گروه حقوق خصوصی و اسلامی دانشکدۀ حقوق و علوم سیاسی، دانشگاه تهران، تهران، ایران،
2 دانشآموختۀ دکتری حقوق خصوصی دانشکدۀ حقوق و علوم سیاسی، دانشگاه تهران، تهران، ایران،
چکیده
کلیدواژهها
عنوان مقاله [English]
نویسندگان [English]
Introduction
The question of whether deceased persons can possess rights has long been among the most challenging issues in legal philosophy and moral theory. Traditional legal systems generally assume that legal personality ends with death; therefore, a deceased individual can no longer hold rights or obligations. This assumption is reflected in many legal systems, including Iranian law, where legal capacity is usually understood to terminate upon death. However, despite the formal end of legal personality, many contemporary legal systems continue to recognize and protect certain interests associated with deceased persons. Examples include the protection of bodily integrity after death, respect for burial wishes, enforcement of wills, preservation of reputation, and the continuation of moral rights in intellectual property.
The persistence of these protections poses an important theoretical problem: if the deceased no longer exist as legal persons, on what basis can these protections be justified? In response, legal philosophers have proposed various theories concerning the nature and foundation of rights. Two of the most influential approaches are the Will Theory and the Interest Theory. According to the Will Theory, rights are grounded in the autonomy and freedom of the right-holder and require the capacity to exercise choice or control over duties. In contrast, the Interest Theory argues that rights exist primarily to protect significant interests or benefits belonging to an individual.
This article focuses on the Interest Theory as the most convincing basis for recognizing the rights of the deceased. According to this theory, rights are justified whenever an individual possesses interests important enough to impose duties upon others. Some human interests persist beyond biological death, such as interests in reputation, dignity, testamentary wishes, bodily integrity, and symbolic legacy. Consequently, the deceased may still be regarded as holders of certain rights. The theory therefore expands the category of right-holders beyond living human beings and acknowledges that some interests survive the end of physical life.
The article also distinguishes between traditional and modern interpretations of the Interest Theory. Classical utilitarian thinkers such as Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill primarily justified posthumous protections on the grounds of social utility and the prevention of harm to living persons. Modern theorists, including Joseph Raz, Matthew Kramer, Neil MacCormick, and Daniel Sperling, have developed broader approaches that recognize the independent moral relevance of deceased persons themselves. These scholars emphasize continuing interests, symbolic existence, and the deceased’s ongoing membership in the moral community of humanity.
The main objective of this study is to explain how the Interest Theory justifies posthumous rights and to demonstrate that it provides a stronger foundation for the rights of the deceased than competing theories, especially the Will Theory.
Methodology
This research employs a descriptive-analytical method based on legal philosophy, ethics, and comparative jurisprudence. The research also adopts a comparative legal approach by examining examples from Iranian law and broader legal systems.
Conclusions
The study concludes that the Interest Theory provides the most persuasive philosophical and legal basis for recognizing rights of the deceased. Unlike the Will Theory, which depends on autonomy and the ability to exercise choice, the Interest Theory focuses on protecting significant interests. Since many human interests survive death, the end of biological life does not necessarily eliminate all grounds for rights.
The research demonstrates that deceased persons may continue to possess interests in reputation, dignity, bodily integrity, testamentary wishes, and symbolic identity. Harm inflicted on these interests may undermine values central to the person’s life and identity. Furthermore, the deceased remain symbolically connected to society through memory, legacy, family relations, and cultural identity. In this sense, they continue to belong to the moral community of humanity even after death.
The article also concludes that modern interpretations of the Interest Theory are more successful than classical utilitarian approaches in explaining posthumous rights. While traditional theorists primarily justified these rights on the grounds of benefits to living persons, modern theorists recognize the deceased themselves as morally relevant subjects. Concepts such as symbolic existence and continuing moral membership provide a stronger ethical basis for legal protection after death.
Nevertheless, posthumous rights are not absolute or unlimited. Their duration and scope depend on the nature of the relevant interests and the extent to which those interests remain socially meaningful. Some rights, such as protection of reputation or moral rights in intellectual property, may endure for a long period, whereas others may gradually fade over time.
Ultimately, the Interest Theory adeptly broadens the conventional scope of legal rights by acknowledging that certain human interests transcend corporeal existence. Within this paradigm, the deceased are perceived not merely as subjects of reverence but as ongoing possessors of morally and legally substantial interests meriting safeguarding.
کلیدواژهها [English]
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