بنیاد شخصیت حقوقی انسان و امکان‌سنجی شمول آن بر حیوانات

نوع مقاله : مقاله پژوهشی

نویسنده

استادیار گروه حقوق دانشکدۀ علوم انسانی دانشگاه آزاد اسلامی، قزوین، ایران.

10.22059/jlq.2026.401836.1008027

چکیده

بنابر نظریۀ سنتی، شخصیت حقوقی به موجودیت‌هایی اطلاق می‌شود که دارای حقوق و/یا تکالیف باشند یا توانایی برخورداری از حق و /یا تکلیف را داشته باشند. این موجودیت از دیرباز تاکنون بر پایۀ نظریۀ منفعت یا نظریۀ اراده، صرفاً به انسان‌ها و یا نهادهای حقوقی تأسیس‌شده توسط انسان اختصاص داده شده است. در مقابل نظریه خوشه‌ای با بازخوانی غیرانسان-محور از نظریه منفعت و اراده، امکان شناسایی حیوانات و برخی مظاهر طبیعی (نظیر رودخانه‌ها) را به‌عنوان موجودات صاحب حق و برخوردار از شخصیت حقوقی فراهم کرده است. شخصیت حقوقی بر پایۀ دو شاخص اصلی قانونی‌گرایی واقعی‌گرایی شناسایی می‌شود. بر مبنای قانونی‌گرایی، هر موجودیتی صرف‌نظر از ویژگی‌های واقعی، به محض شناسایی رسمی و معتبر از سوی یک مرجع قانونی صلاحیتدار، دارای شخصیت حقوقی خواهد بود. در مقابل واقعی‌گرایی شناسایی شخصیت حقوقی برای هر موجودیتی را منوط به برخورداری از برخی ویژگی‌های واقعی (نظیر اراده، عقلانیت و ادراک) می‌داند. از نظر نگارنده نظریۀ منفعت و همچنین خوانش طبیعت‌گرایانه از معیار واقعی‌گرایی، بستر مناسبی برای شناسایی شخصیت حقوقی حیوانات و طبیعت به‌شمار می‌آیند. مبنای شخصیت حقوقی انسان و حیوانات در نظام حقوقی ایران به مانند دیگر نظام‌های حقوقی معاصر، به استناد مواد قانون مدنی و قوانین محیطی زیستی بر پایۀ نظریۀ سنتی توانایی برخورداری از حقوق و یا تکالیف استوار است که صرفاً انسان را به‌عنوان شخص می‌شناسد و حیوانات را در دستۀ اشیا قرار می‌دهد.

کلیدواژه‌ها


عنوان مقاله [English]

The Foundation of Human Legal Personality and the Feasibility of Extending It to Animals

نویسنده [English]

  • Smaeil Keshavarz Safiyi
Assistant Professor, Faculty of Humanities, Islamic Azad University, Qazvin Branch, Qazvin, Iran.
چکیده [English]

Introduction
One of the fundamental and determining institutions in the structure of legal systems is the concept of legal personality. In a way, the skeleton of any legal system can be considered the concept of legal personality. According to a long-standing tradition, humans have been defined in the legal framework as persons. In contrast, other non-human entities have been identified as other concepts, such as objects or property. With the progress of societies and economic and social changes, the concept of legal personality and its included instances have undergone transformation. This includes the emergence of companies, offices, and non-governmental organizations, which led to the classification of legal personality into real (natural) and legal (artificial) persons. With the emergence of environmental changes and the growing tendency to protect animals and other natural phenomena on the one hand, and advances in robotics and artificial intelligence on the other, the issue of recognizing non-human entities as subjects of rights and as having legal personality has expanded more than ever. Movements such as animal rights and nature rights have taken firm steps towards recognizing non-human living entities as legal persons with rights. What has received less attention in the meantime is the identification of the foundations of human legal personality and the feasibility of recognizing these foundations in the case of animals and manifestations of nature. Research conducted in domestic works so far has focused on animal rights, and there is no work that examines the foundations of human legal personality and the feasibility of animals having legal personality. Accordingly, in this innovative and pioneering research, we seek to identify these foundations in humans and assess the capacity of non-human entities to enjoy these fundamental components.
Method
The research was conducted in a descriptive-analytical manner. The required sources and data were collected through library research and by consulting websites and reputable domestic and foreign databases.
Conclusion
The traditional (orthodox) theory of legal personality includes a rights/duties-based approach that attributes legal personality to entities with the capacity to hold rights and/or duties. This approach, from the past to the present, across all legal systems influenced by the two theories of benefit and will, has considered only humans and human-created institutions (such as companies, offices, and non-governmental organizations) worthy of legal personality. In the legal works of traditional theories, two indicators have been introduced to identify legal personality: legalism and realism. According to legalism, legal personality is a title created by law, and the legislator can grant it to any entity he deems necessary, based on interests. Therefore, being human and possessing human characteristics do not necessarily entail legal personality. In contrast, realists believe that the existence of certain primarily human-centered characteristics (such as intelligence, will, self-awareness, and holiness) is the basis for having legal personality. However, in recent decades, with the expansion of movements to protect the rights of animals and natural phenomena, the traditional, anthropocentric foundations of legal personality have been reinterpreted and revised. The design of a Bundle Theory legal personality by Visa Korki, emphasizing the ability to be placed in certain legal situations, as well as the nature-centric reinterpretation of the theories of benefit and will, has paved the way for the gradual acceptance of legal personality for animals. In addition, among the indicators for identifying legal personality, the legality indicator, by adopting a non-human-centered approach and emphasizing the legislator's authority in determining legal personality, is more appropriate for recognizing the legal personality of animals. Meanwhile, the nature-centered reading of the realist index and the acknowledgment that animals (at least some animals such as primates and dolphins) possess human mental characteristics (such as will, intelligence, and emotional perception of pleasure and pain) provide a suitable basis for recognizing the legal personality of animals.
 
 
 
 
 

کلیدواژه‌ها [English]

  • Legal ersonality
  • Legalism
  • Realism
  • Cluster Theory
  • rthodox
  • Animals
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