نوع مقاله : مقاله پژوهشی
عنوان مقاله English
نویسنده English
Introduction
The demand for compensation has always been one of humanity's primary needs. To meet this need, various traditions have long governed this area, and numerous theories have shaped the legal system's rules.
In this progression, although an ideal compensation system should enable all injured parties to obtain fair recompense regardless of the search for the cause of the harm, this expectation was often unmet in the past or inadequately met under the influence of familial solidarity. Consequently, in step with social transformations, the law has had to develop different mechanisms to meet this growing demand for security. Following the identification of certain causes for liability in early civilizations and the legal obligation to compensate for damages, the "Principle of Responsibility" made it possible to provide for losses through a general rule based on various foundations such as fault, risk, etc., and finally, in the continuation of this path, special or automatic systems of compensation for damages were created. The question is, from a perspective of justice, what underlying thought justifies this evolution in law and the demand for compensation?
Some scholars, discussing the evolution of the compensation system, indicate that in this developmental process, the debt of responsibility transforms into the right to compensation. In this Analysis, when the corrective justice of responsibility cannot compensate for the adverse consequences of unfortunate events, it is replaced by the distributive justice of solidarity. As this analysis shows, the measure of justice that assesses damage can be either corrective or distributive, and this division reflects the difference that justifies the logic of compensation institutions and explains the consequences of choosing each one.
The concepts of corrective and distributive justice have been studied since ancient civilizations. The influence of these concepts on civil liability has also been frequently discussed and re-examined. Regardless of the philosophical debates, the role of distributive and corrective justice in compensation raises considerations and leads to legal consequences that warrant examination. Rather than repeatedly emphasizing definitions and theories, this article examines the role of corrective justice in compensation by considering legal realities, the relationships between the parties in a harmful event, and the motivations of third parties and groups responsible for providing compensation. It then argues that distributive justice is impossible in civil liability and examines the effects of separating distributive and corrective justice in compensation.
Method
This study uses a documentary and library research method to review conventional beliefs about justice in compensation through a different legal analysis of theoretical data.
Conclusion
Facilities and costs are distributed among citizens according to the merits defined by each society. This division, whether correct or incorrect, has nothing to do with civil liability. Civil liability intervenes when an incident occurs and disrupts the predefined balance. Therefore, the question is whether, in this situation, civil responsibility can establish a new allocation of rights, or merely provide the possibility of ensuring justice in the redistribution of social opportunities and possibilities.
Compensation, in any form, whether based on corrective or distributive principles, is a means for achieving justice. Despite the development of various methods and principles presented as theories of compensation, the traditional framework of compensation and civil liability remains limited to the corrective idea. In principle, the various foundations of civil liability all agree that the burden of the loss must be returned to its agent. This agent, who is ultimately human, is responsible for the harmful act attributed to him, and compensation for the damages will be instead of her agency in the realization of the loss.
Furthermore, despite growing social demand for compensation, the closed framework of corrective justice cannot cover all adverse consequences. Therefore, alongside the expansion of civil liability, distributive justice (through social solidarity) supports corrective justice and even replaces it in some of the traditional duties of civil liability. In reality, the idea of distributive justice does not expand civil liability; rather, it directs a portion of the duty to compensate outside this institution. Moreover, distributive justice allows an approach in which coverage for new risks is provided, or compensation is provided that is not compensatory in nature.
Although developing compensation rights through the distributive idea is desirable, it should not go too far: on the one hand, civil liability cannot be replaced or erased, and conversely, the idea of compensatory justice is deeply rooted in it. On the other hand, accepting distributive justice must take various exigencies into account. Therefore, public institutions must respect budgetary requirements and financial capacity in this regard. Moreover, applying distributive justice and compensation outside the conventional liability system should not create a sense of discrimination or lead to unjustifiable disparity among victims of similar incidents. Attention to these issues and adopting the necessary measures and arrangements means that distributive justice plays a secondary role in compensation law and can only complement civil liability.
کلیدواژهها English
