تحلیلی بر عناصر شناختاری و موارد کاربست قرارداد لیسانس فرند

نوع مقاله : مقاله پژوهشی

نویسندگان

1 استادیار گروه حقوق تجارت بین‌الملل و حقوق مالکیت فکری و فضای مجازی، دانشکدة حقوق، دانشگاه شهید بهشتی، تهران، ایران

2 دانش‌آموخته کارشناسی ارشد رشتة حقوق مالکیت فکری، دانشکدة حقوق، دانشگاه شهید بهشتی، تهران، ایران

چکیده

     قرارداد لیسانس منصفانه، معقول و غیرتبعیض‌آمیز (فرند)، از راهبردهای مبتنی بر حقوق مالکیت فکری سازمان‌های تعیین استاندارد در مواجهه با فناوری‌هایی است که به‌حدی در یک صنعت اهمیت می‌یابند که به یک استاندارد فنی تبدیل می‌شوند. این قرارداد نقشی برجسته در توسعة استانداردهای فنی و بهره‌برداری و انتقال فناوری‌های ضروری استاندارد ایفا می‌کند. مقالة پیش رو می‌کوشد تا با روش کتابخانه‌ای و به شیوة تحلیلی- توصیفی و با تعمق در رهیافت‌های مطروحه در حقوق کشورهای مختلف، ابعاد شناختاری قرارداد لیسانس فرند را تبیین و مواردی را که بنگاه‌های متقاضی یا مراجع قانونی از ظرفیت‌های این دست توافقات بهره می‌گیرند، بررسی  کند. نتایج این نوشتار مبین آن است که ترسیم ساختار لیسانس‌های فرند از سوی سازمان‌های تعیین استاندارد و محاکم با ابهامات و چالش‌های جدی مواجه است که خود بر تعیین حدود حقوق و تعهدات طرفین و نحوة استفاده از فناوری‌های ضروری استاندارد تأثیر نامطلوب گذاشته است. نظام حقوقی ایران از بستر حقوقی لازم جهت کاربست لیسانس فرند بی‌بهره است و قواعد عام موجود نیز گاه بیش از اینکه گره‌گشای معضلات باشند، خود به مانعی بر سر استفادة گسترده و کارا از این دست فناوری‌ها بدل می‌شوند؛ ازاین‌رو نوشتار حاضر می‌کوشد تا ضمن تحلیل موضوع و بهره‌گیری از تجربیات و یافته‌های حقوقی دیگر نظام‌ها، پیشنهادها و راهکارهایی را در مواجهه با مسائل خاص این توافق در چارچوب حقوق ایران ارائه کند.

کلیدواژه‌ها

عنوان مقاله [English]

AN ANALYSIS ON DEFINITION ELEMENTS AND APPLICATION CASES OF FRAND LICENSE

نویسندگان [English]

  • Ebrahim Rahbari 1
  • Fatemeh Yazdandoost 2
1 Assistant Professor of International Trade and IP Law & Cyberspace, Law Department, Shahid Beheshti University, Tehran, Iran
2 MA in Intellectual Property Law, Law Department, Shahid Beheshti University, Tehran, Iran
چکیده [English]

FRAND license as one of the strategies based on intellectual property law adopted by standard-setting organizations, observe technologies of technical standards because of their importance in particular art. Such license can play significant role in developing technical standards, and exploiting and transferring essential standard technologies. Having contemplated in approaches raised in different legal systems, this paper in descriptive – analytical method is going to clarify the notion of FRAND license and survey the situations that lead to employing such agreement by undertakings and competent authorities. The results show that design of the structure of FRAND license by standard-setting organizations and courts has encountered serious challenges which in its turn has had adverse effects on determining process of rights and obligations of parties as well as using essential standard technologies. Iranian law lacks legal essentials in applying FRAND license and existing general rules impede extensive and efficient exploitation of such technologies rather than solve the problems. Accordingly, having analyzed the driftnet aspects of subject and benefiting legal experiences and findings of other countries, current paper tries to provide some suggestions and approaches confronting particular matters of FRAND license in Iranian law framework.

کلیدواژه‌ها [English]

  • FRAND license
  • Essential standard technology
  • Technical standards
  • Patent law
  • Intellectual property agreements

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مطالعات حقوق خصوصی
دوره 49، شماره 4
دی 1398
صفحه 635-653

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